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FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL COMPETITION 
IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 
JONATHAN L. MARSHFIELD

 
ABSTRACT 
Political competition is essential to the development and maintenance 
of a healthy and stable democracy. Current scholarship has largely 
ignored the role that federalism can play in fostering meaningful political 
competition in emerging democracies. This Article aims to fill this void by 
developing a theory of political competition within federal systems based 
on a formal game theory model created by economist and Nobel Laureate 
Roger B. Myerson. The Article argues that constructive political 
competition is especially difficult in emerging democracies because social 
and economic exigencies create strong incentives for new leadership to 
quash opposition and because first-time voters do not have a point of 
comparison by which to judge their first set of democratic leaders. Unitary 
regimes exacerbate these problems because they create an all-or-nothing 
political scenario and provide voters with only one point of political 
comparison. Federal systems, on the other hand, create multiple political 
arenas. This means that political opposition can be contained without 
being quashed, and that voters will have multiple points of political 
comparison. After exploring the necessary parameters of this model, the 
Article then applies the model to post-apartheid South Africa, which has 
been controlled by a single political party since the country’s first 
democratic election in 1994. The Article concludes that South Africa’s 
federal structure is gradually fostering constructive political competition 
as the model suggests and that opposition parties in South Africa are well 
situated to take further advantage of these opportunities in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By all accounts, South Africa‘s negotiated transition from apartheid to 
democracy was one of the great accomplishments of the twentieth 
century.
1
 There are, however, reasons to be concerned about the stability 
and maturity of South Africa‘s democracy. A primary concern is the 
African National Congress‘s (ANC) stronghold on political life.2 The 
ANC is the only political party to have held national power since South 
Africa‘s first democratic election in 1994.3 In the three elections that have 
been held since then, the ANC has never won less than sixty-six percent of 
the national vote.
4
 
South Africa‘s experience is illustrative of a larger trend of one-party 
dominance in emerging democracies.
5
 Many societies that transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy
6
 struggle to develop political cultures that 
 
 
 1. See Peter N. Bouckaert, Note, The Negotiated Revolution: South Africa’s Transition to a 
Multiracial Democracy, 33 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 375, 375 (1997) (characterizing South Africa‘s transition 
to democracy as ―one of the greatest political achievements of this century‖); see also Marianne Geula, 
Note, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternate Means of Addressing 
Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 57, 59–63 (2000) 
(providing concise description of transition to democracy). 
 2. See Roger Southall, The ‘Dominant Party Debate’ in South Africa, 2005 AFR. SPECTRUM 61, 
64–65 (summarizing concerns associated with ANC‘s dominance of post-apartheid democracy); Adam 
Habib & Rupert Taylor, Parliamentary Opposition & Democratic Consolidation in South Africa, 26 
REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 261, (1999) (discussing relationship between democratic stability and ANC 
political dominance). 
 3. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Results, http://www.elections.org.za 
(click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) [hereinafter IEC Results] (providing 
official election results for all of South Africa‘s post-apartheid elections); see also Norbert Kersting, 
Voting Behaviour in the 2009 South African Election, 2009 AFR. SPECTRUM 125 (summarizing ANC‘s 
dominance since 1994).  
 4. IEC Results, supra note 3. The ANC won 63% of the national vote in 1994, 66% in 1999, 
70% in 2004, and 66% in 2009. Id.  
 5. See Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins, The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa, 
Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE: ONE-PARTY 
DOMINATION AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins eds., 1999) (discussing 
general trend of one-party dominance in emerging democracies and specifically discussing Mexico, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Africa); see also ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT 59–69 (2000) (listing countries that have experienced one-party dominance 
notwithstanding democratic elections including, among others, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Egypt, 
Gambia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Senegal, South Africa, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, and Turkey).  
 6. Following Samuel P. Huntington, this Article uses the term ―authoritarianism‖ to refer to any 
form of government that is non-democratic. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11–13 (1991). Following Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, democracy refers to ―that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people‘s vote.‖  
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (2d ed. 1947); see also 
HUNTINGTON, supra, at 6–10 (explaining why Schumpeter‘s procedural definition of democracy is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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support loyal opposition and constructive political competition.
7
 This trend 
is troubling because political competition is inextricably linked with 
democratic stability. Mature, stable democracies almost universally exhibit 
vibrant two-party or multi-party political systems.
8
 Indeed, democratic 
theorists generally agree that ―a functioning political opposition is 
essential to democracy.‖9 
Yet, emerging democracies face significant obstacles to loyal political 
opposition.
10
 Social, economic, and political exigencies associated with 
dramatic political transition can create strong incentives for the first-
elected party to consolidate power and quash opposition.
11
 An additional, 
 
 
best for purposes of classification and comparative analysis). As used in this Article, ―emerging 
democracy‖ refers to a country that is transitioning or has recently transitioned from authoritarianism 
to democracy. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of 
Religious Parties, 32 COMP. POL., 379 (2000) (using the term similarly).  
 7. See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 5, at 2–3 (arguing that many dominant-party systems 
occur ―on the heels‖ of revolution or political transition of some kind). This trend was widely observed 
during the democratization of the former Soviet Union. See Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutions, 
Elections, and Election Law, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1603–06 (2009).  
 8. See AREND LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND 
PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 76–77 (1999) [hereinafter LIJPHART, GOVERNMENT FORMS 
AND PERFORMANCE] (listing party ratios for thirty-six democracies between 1945 and 1996); AREND 
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-
ONE COUNTRIES 106–26 (1984) [hereinafter LIJPHART, MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS 
GOVERNMENT] (listing party ratios for twenty-two democracies between 1945 and 1980). Political 
parties are not a necessary condition for democracy. PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, at 20 n.8. 
However, modern democratic competition is generally structured around political parties. Id at 20. 
More important, in systems where at least one party exists, political competition depends on the 
existence of a viable opposition party. Id. Thus, one-party states are generally indicative of a lack of 
meaningful political competition. Id.  
 9. Courtney Jung & Ian Shapiro, South Africa’s Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, 
and the New Constitutional Order, 23 POL. & SOC‘Y 269, 272 (1995). Many theorists go further and 
claim that a democracy is not fully consolidated until there has been at least one peaceful transfer of 
power to an opposition party following the initial transition to democracy. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, 
supra note 6, at 266–67 (articulating now famous ―two-turnover‖ test for democratic consolidation); 
ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN 
EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10 (1991) (―Democracy is a system in which parties lose 
elections . . . .‖).  
 10. ―Loyal opposition‖ refers to political opposition that recognizes a distinction between 
opposition to extant leadership and opposition to the underlying political order. See HUNTINGTON, 
supra note 6, at 261–62. Within a democracy, loyal opposition may oppose a particular party or leader, 
but it must nevertheless recognize democratic processes as the legitimate means for resolving political 
conflict. See Barrington Moore, Jr., Liberal Prospects under Soviet Socialism: A Comparative 
Historical Perspective, in MORAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND OTHER ESSAYS 82, 84–91 
(1998) (defining ―loyal opposition‖ and tracing its roots to monarchal regimes).  
 11. Government performance is critically important for young democracies to survive. Emerging 
democracies have a small window of opportunity to demonstrate their efficacy. Democracies that fail 
to deliver basic public services and economic growth tend to fail. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 
258–61. These circumstances create strong incentives for quashing political opposition. See Giliomee 
& Simkins, supra note 5, at xii; infra Part II.A (discussing this problem in more detail). Emerging 
democracies also face a crisis of regime loyalty. They are faced with residual supporters of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/4
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and perhaps more universal, obstacle to political competition in emerging 
democracies concerns the peculiar circumstances facing first-time voters. 
Within mature democracies there are typically many political leaders that 
have established reputations for using political power within constitutional 
constraints and for the public good.
12
 Voters therefore have the ability to 
make real comparisons between democratic leaders and their policy 
platforms.
13
 Political track records provide voters with a means of 
evaluating a candidate‘s propensity to adopt efficacious policies and a 
credible basis to believe a candidate‘s promises.14 These circumstances 
create a competitive market for votes in which political track records are 
the most valuable currency.
15
 Voters in emerging democracies are situated 
in a fundamentally different political game. There are no established 
leaders with credible reputations for democratic governance.
16
 Thus, 
voters have no real reference point against which to compare the 
performance or policies of the first-elected government or any challengers. 
Additionally, even if voters become dissatisfied with the first-elected 
government, they have no reason to believe that an incumbent will 
perform any better because incumbents cannot demonstrate their 
credibility or competence by reference to an established track record. As a 
result, many emerging democratic societies stifle political competition by 
repeatedly re-electing bad leadership.
17
 
 
 
authoritarianism. This creates incentives for new leaders to quash all opposition out of fear that any 
opposition will undermine the new democratic order. See infra Part II.A (discussing this problem in 
more detail).  
 12. Roger B. Myerson, Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy, 1 Q. J. POL. SCI. 1, 
3–4 (2006).  
 13. Id.  
 14. This model of voter choice is not undisputed. See John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance 
and Electoral Control, 30 PUB. CHOICE 5 (1986) (arguing that a better model of voter choice is based 
on voters as primarily forward looking). But see V.O. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE: 
RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING 1936–1960 (1966) (offering support for voter choice model 
based on reputations); Jeffrey S. Banks & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Optimal Retention in Agency 
Problems, 82 J. ECON. THEORY 293 (1998) (same). More important than these disputes regarding 
modeling, there is significant empirical evidence that voters do in fact rely on a candidate‘s past 
reputation in making electoral choices. See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN 
AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981); Gerald H. Kramer, Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting 
Behavior, 1896–1964, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131 (1971). 
 15. For classic economic models of voter activity along these lines see Gerald H. Kramer, A 
Dynamic Model of Political Equilibrium, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 310 (1977) and Richard D. McKelvey, 
Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium, 43 ECONOMETRICA 815 (1975).  
 16. See H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling 
Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761 
(2008) (discussing the problems facing emerging democracies caused by inexperienced democratic 
leadership).  
 17. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, at 25–27 (listing countries that have been caught in 
this cycle at various times). The dynamics of this process are complex and multi-variant. See Myerson, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Notwithstanding these serious problems facing emerging democracies, 
there has been very little theoretical research exploring the ways in which 
institutional design can foster constructive political competition.
18
 Most 
theoretical discussions simply assert that democracy is incompatible with 
formal legal restraints on political opposition.
19
 While these negative 
assertions are no doubt true, they do not address the more constructive 
issue of how to design institutions that can counteract one-party 
dominance by creating positive incentives for constructive political 
competition in emerging democracies.
20
 This Article takes up that 
important but neglected question. It argues that well-designed federal 
arrangements are one way to effectively counteract some of the obstacles 
to political competition facing emerging democracies. 
Federalism can facilitate political competition in at least two ways. 
First, in a unitary system there is only one political arena. This means that 
only one political party has the opportunity to develop a positive track 
record at any given time, and, consequently, the first-elected party in an 
emerging democracy has a monopoly on voters‘ expectations. In a federal 
regime, however, there are multiple constitutionally protected political 
arenas.
21
 Federalism creates the possibility that several different political 
parties can develop political track records at the same time. This, in turn, 
provides voters with points of comparison, and, consequently, creates a 
competitive market for votes based on positive political track records. In 
this way, the decentralization of political power by federal arrangement is 
better suited to facilitate political competition than a unitary system.
22
 In 
economic terms, it can reduce opportunity costs associated with political 
choice. 
 
 
supra note 12, at 5–7. The claim here is only that a lack of political track records is one real problem 
facing emerging democracies. Id.  
 18. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 271 (noting absence of research in this area). 
 19. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 7–9. These can include legal restraints on political 
association or the press, or direct and indirect manipulation of votes and voting districts. Id.  
 20. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 273–75; Myerson, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that 
literature on federalism considers effects of devolving policy-making authority to subnational units 
and ignores role that federalism can play in providing incentives for democratic stability). Nobel 
Laureate and economist Roger B. Myerson has developed a formal game theory model dealing with 
federalism and incentives for non-corrupt governance. Id. Myerson‘s model relies on political 
competition as a means of creating incentives for leaders to withstand corruption. Id. at 4–7. This 
appears to be the only literature addressing the relationship between federalism and political 
competition. The model developed here draws on Myerson‘s formal game theory model, but develops 
a series of additional parameters that expand Myerson‘s model beyond his original application. See 
infra Part III (discussing Myerson‘s model).  
 21. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 107–09 (1987) (defining federalism as 
legal arrangement that divides power between various spheres of government).  
 22. See infra Part III (developing and supporting this claim).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/4
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Second, federalism is well suited to dealing with the incentives to 
quash political opposition that appear in many emerging democracies. 
First-elected leaders are under extreme pressure to address momentous 
social problems quickly and effectively.
23
 This creates incentives for the 
ruling party to remove impediments to swift government action, including 
political opposition. Unitary regimes exacerbate this problem because they 
create an all-or-nothing political scenario. By creating multiple spheres of 
political authority, federalism creates new possibilities for compromise 
and consensus between political groups.
24
 For example, certain contested 
issues can be left undecided at the national level but delegated to 
subnational government. This can make it easier for first-elected 
governments to avoid political deadlocks and direct political confrontation 
at the national level, thus mitigating the incentives to quash all 
opposition.
25
  
This is not to suggest that federalism can solve all exigencies facing 
new democratic regimes. The more modest but nevertheless important 
point is that unitary regimes create an all-or-nothing political scenario, 
which creates incentives for the first-elected party to quash all opposition 
and provides voters with only one point of political comparison. Federal 
arrangements, on the other hand, create multiple political arenas. This 
means that competition can be contained without being destroyed, and that 
voters will, from time zero, have multiple points of political comparison. 
In short, federalism can foster constructive political opposition because it 
creates legally independent spheres of competition that operate 
simultaneously.  
After further extrapolating the necessary parameters of the above 
model, this Article analyzes South Africa‘s federal structure to determine 
 
 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in Transitional Federal 
States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 
585, 621–29 (2008) (explaining how South Africa‘s federal structure played this role during transition 
from apartheid to democracy). Federalism can operate in this way by formally memorializing 
negotiated compromises that divide issues between central and subnational government. Federalism 
may also alleviate the zero-sum game in a less formal way. By simply creating legally independent 
political arenas, political parties will gravitate towards those arenas where they are most likely to be 
successful. Multiple arenas create more chances that more parties will at least find one arena where 
they can gain significant support. This obviously increases the chances that meaningful political 
opposition will develop. It also reduces the need for national consensus on all issues, and, 
consequently, mitigates the incentives to quash opposition. Unitary regimes do not afford this 
alternative.  
 25. See infra Part III.C (defending this claim); Marshfield, supra note 24, at 625–28 (explaining 
how this actually occurred in South Africa during the transition to democracy).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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its prospects for fostering political competition.
26
 It then examines the role 
that South Africa‘s federal structure has played in the various recent 
successes of parties opposing the ANC. The Article concludes that South 
Africa‘s federal structure is conducive to fostering political opposition and 
that, notwithstanding the ANC‘s prevailing dominance, evidence suggests 
that South Africa‘s federal structure is gradually fostering healthy political 
competition. The Article then looks forward to South Africa‘s 2014 
general elections and analyzes which opposition parties are best situated to 
take advantage of South Africa‘s federal structure and challenge the ANC.  
This Article has eight major parts. Part I explores the theoretical 
connection between political competition and democratic stability and 
proposes three reasons why democratic stability is inextricably linked to 
political competition. Part II explains some of the major obstacles to 
constructive political competition facing emerging democracies. Part III 
develops and defends the argument that federal systems are better situated 
than unitary regimes to remove impediments to political competition 
facing emerging democracies. It also describes the particular kind of 
federal regime that is necessary for the model to work effectively. Parts IV 
through VII analyze South Africa‘s federal structure in light of the model 
and determine that the South African system both satisfies necessary legal 
parameters and is in fact fostering political competition. Part VIII 
concludes by examining the current nature and status of the most notable 
opposition parties in South Africa and explores their prospects for 
challenging the ANC in the country‘s next general election in 2014.  
I. POLITICAL COMPETITION AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY 
Theorists have long struggled to identify background conditions 
necessary for maintaining stable democracies.
27
 Studies have revealed 
compelling correlations between democratic stability and certain 
economic, cultural, and political conditions.
28
 In this vein, there is general 
 
 
 26. South Africa presents an ideal test case for this thesis for several reasons. First, South Africa 
underwent a dramatic transition from apartheid to democracy that culminated with the country‘s first 
all-inclusive election in 1994. Second, the politics of post-apartheid South Africa have been dominated 
by a single party, the ANC. Third, since the fall of apartheid, South Africa has operated under a 
constitutionally protected federal structure. Fourth, notwithstanding the ANC‘s political dominance, 
post-apartheid South Africa has always had several organized and active opposition parties.  
 27. The study that is most frequently credited with first attempting to identify correlations 
between democratic stability and economic, cultural, and social background conditions is SEYMOUR 
MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS (1981).  
 28. Prominent studies include: PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5; Carles Boix & Susan C. 
Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, 55 WORLD POL. 517 (2003); Daron Acemoglu & James A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss2/4
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consensus among democratic theorists that there is a strong empirical 
correlation between political competition and democratic stability.
29
 
Stable, long-lasting democracies almost universally correlate with 
alternation in political power between at least two political parties.
30
  
Although this empirical correlation has strong intuitive appeal, it is 
largely unhelpful on its own because it fails to provide a sound theoretical 
explanation for the nexus between political competition and democracy.
31
 
Why does meaningful political competition tend to correlate with 
democratic stability? This question is particularly important from an 
institutional design perspective. If constitution-makers are to intelligently 
tailor legal arrangements to the problems facing emerging democracies, it 
is essential that they have a working theory regarding the nexus between 
 
 
Robinson, A Theory of Political Transitions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 938 (2001); Julian Wucherpfennig & 
Franziska Deutsch, Modernization and Democracy: Theories and Evidence Revisited, 2009 LIVING 
REVS. DEMOCRACY, at 1 (providing comprehensive summary of state of economic development 
theory).  
 29. Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272 (―it is doubtful that any regime could long survive as 
minimally democratic without‖ genuine political opposition); Moore, supra note 10, at 83 (―[t]he key 
characteristic of liberal democracy . . . is the existence of a legitimate and, to some extent, effective 
opposition.‖); see also Robert A. Dahl, Preface to POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES xi (Robert A. Dahl ed. 1966) (―the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes 
against the government in elections . . .‖ is one of the ―great milestones in the development of 
democratic institutions.‖); Stephanie Lawson, Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime 
Change and Democratization, 25 COMP. POL. 183, 192–93 (1993) (―[P]olitical opposition is the sine 
qua non of contemporary democracy in mass polities and . . . its institutionalization in some form or 
another is required before a regime can be called ‗democratic‘ with any real meaning.‖).  
 30. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, 23–30, 51–55 (providing summary of all regime years 
in all countries between 1950 and 1990 and conducting statistical analysis of relationship between 
―stability and change of political leadership‖); see also LIJPHART, GOVERNMENT FORMS AND 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 8, at 76 (cataloguing alternations in political power within thirty-six 
democracies between 1945–1996). This empirical correlation led Samuel P. Huntington to articulate 
his now famous ―two-turnover‖ test for democratic consolidation. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 
266–69. Huntington determined the surest test for democratic consolidation was whether ―the party or 
group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and 
turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over 
power to the winners of a later election.‖ Id. at 266–67. This is a demanding test, however, and many, 
including Huntington, recognize that it is probably under-inclusive of consolidated democracies. Id. at 
267 (noting that the U.S. did not pass two-turnover test until 1840); see also Omar G. Encarnación, 
Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, 32 COMP. POL. 479, 486–87 (2000) 
(discussing problems with the two-turnover test).  
 31. Truisms regarding the relationship between political competition and democracy are 
plentiful. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968) (―Competition in ideas and 
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process . . . .‖). Informed theories regarding the 
precise connection between democracy and competition are more difficult to find. See Peter H. 
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics , 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1365 (1987) (noting that Supreme Court precedent dealing with party 
competition ―beg[s] questions that lie at the heart of political competition in a democracy‖).  
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political competition and democratic stability; particularly any causal 
relationship that may exist between the two.
32
  
This section argues that there are at least three reasons that political 
competition may be linked with democratic stability: (1) political 
competition is indicative of the fact that social conflicts have been brought 
within democratic processes; (2) political competition creates incentives 
for leaders to govern well; and (3) political competition can reduce agency 
costs associated with representative government.
33
  
A. Political Competition as Indicative of Democratic Consolidation 
Benjamin Franklin could have added social disagreement to his famous 
list of life‘s certainties.34 Western political theory is based on the 
assumption that a sovereign authority is necessary to mediate inevitable 
social conflict and disagreement.
35
 Liberal democracy is part of this 
tradition.
36
 Although it vests ultimate sovereignty in the people, it 
recognizes that people will inevitably disagree and that there must be a fair 
means of resolving these disagreements.
37
 Democratic processes are 
 
 
 32. There is a healthy body of literature struggling with a definition of political competition in 
democracies. See Charles Simpkins, Stability and Competitiveness in the Political Configurations of 
Semi-Developed Countries, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE, supra note 5, 47, 49–51 (discussing 
literature). This Article adopts the standard description offered by Giovanni Santori, which holds that 
political competition exist if the political system contains more than one contestant and ―circumstances 
must be imaginable in which challenger parties can defeat the predominant party.‖ Id. at 49 (citing 
GIOVANNI SANTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1976)); see supra 
notes 34–49 and accompanying text (discussing how this definition is intrinsic to democratic 
assumptions). 
 33. The first reason is descriptive. It attempts to explain why an observable correlation between 
democratic stability and political competition occurs. It does not, however, offer a theory of causation 
regarding the relationship between political competition and democratic stability; political competition 
is symptomatic of democratic stability and is not necessarily the cause of stability. The remaining two 
reasons, however, do offer causal theories. They suggest ways that political competition can contribute 
to democratic stability.  
 34. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789–1790 69 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 1907) (―[I]n this world 
nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.‖).  
 35. Hobbes presents perhaps the most well-known example of this theme within western political 
theory. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: WITH SELECTED VARIANTS FROM THE LATIN EDITION OF 
1668 ch. XXIX (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (discussing the need for sovereign to cure ills of state of 
nature); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 339 (discussing Hobbes‘s contribution).  
 36. John Locke‘s theory of democracy is illustrative. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT 42–56 (C.B. Mcpherson ed., 1980).  
 37. See, e.g., LOCKE, supra note 36, at 48 (―And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of 
a common-wealth, by -setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all controversies, and 
redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the of the common-wealth; which judge is the 
legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however 
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considered fair because they respect individual preferences and retain a 
commitment to the people as the ultimate authority rather than the 
people‘s leaders.38  
Thus, if we assume that social disagreement is inevitable, the stability 
and longevity of a democratic regime ultimately depends not on conditions 
such as social homogeneity or tranquility, but on whether all the necessary 
power groups within a society have endorsed democratic processes as the 
only legitimate means of resolving political conflicts.
39
 For democracy to 
be consolidated, groups and individual citizens must respect democratic 
outputs even if those outputs conflict with their own preferences or 
interests.
40
 
It is notoriously difficult to determine whether a society has achieved 
democratic consolidation.
41
 However, an absence of political competition 
within democratic processes is highly indicative of non-consolidation.
42
 
Samuel P. Huntington has noted: ―In any society, the sustained failure of 
the major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises 
questions concerning the degree of competition permitted by the 
system.‖43 Implicit in Huntington‘s hypothesis is the assumption that 
 
 
associated, that have not such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.‖); 
PRZEWORSKI, supra note 9, at 95 (―Conflicts of values and of interests are inherent in all societies. . . . 
Democracy is only a system for processing conflicts without killing one another; it is a system in 
which there are differences, conflicts, winners and losers.‖).  
 38. See John Ferejohn, Must Preferences be Respected in a Democracy?, in THE IDEA OF 
DEMOCRACY 231 (David Copp et al. eds., 1993) (discussing democracy‘s role in respecting 
preferences).  
 39. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 266–69. Obviously, homogeneity and other social 
conditions make this level of agreement more or less probable and more or less easier to obtain. See 
Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int‘l L. 489, 
526 (2001) (noting possible role of homogeneity in democratic stability but noting that democracy 
does not require a common demos).  
 40. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 266–69; see also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND 
DISAGREEMENT 147–63 (1999) (explaining how democratic processes respect all citizens‘ preferences 
even though the minority is ultimately subject to will of the majority).  
 41. See supra note 30 (discussing Huntington‘s two-turnover test for consolidation and critiques 
of this test); PRZEWORSKI, supra note 5, at 13–36 (discussing problems with determining consolidation 
and expounding a four-part test); see generally THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 1–55 (Robert A. Dahl 
et al. eds., 2003) (providing a helpful sampling of excerpts from various democratic theorists debating 
competing conceptions of democracy and democratic consolidation).  
 42. See PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 5, at 23–28 (crafting an ―alternation rule‖ in order to 
ensure that non-democratic societies are not misclassified).  
 43. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 8. Huntington‘s test assumes that within a free society, 
politics will always be characterized by some degree of political competition. Thus, if there is no 
observable political competition as evidenced by electoral victories, the system must have erected 
restrains to political competition. Id. Huntington‘s definition must be moderated by the realization that 
different political systems reflect political competition in different ways. See Jung & Shapiro, supra 
note 9, at 274. First-past-the-post electoral systems, for example, usually result in two-party systems 
and highly visible alternation in political power. Id. Multi-party systems usually result in coalition 
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democracy involves the resolution of conflict between competing groups. 
If there is a systematic absence of any meaningful political opposition, this 
is most likely because the system is curbing opposition, not because the 
society is void of any political disagreement. Another alternative that 
Huntington overlooks is that political opposition exists, but it refuses to 
recognize democratic processes as legitimate.
44
 In either case, there is a 
lack of consolidation because major social conflicts have not been brought 
within democratic processes.
45
  
Disagreement in emerging democracies is all the more certain. 
Societies that transition from authoritarianism to democracy inevitably 
consist of many individuals, groups, and institutions with conflicting 
loyalties.
46
 These societies are inevitably fractured and characterized by 
various political, cultural, and social cleavages. The challenge for 
emerging democracies is how to institutionalize these conflicts.
47
 That is, 
emerging democracies must convince all major social groups to endorse 
democratic procedures and institutions as the proper means of resolving 
conflict. Until they do so, they remain a threat to the democratic order 
itself.
48
  
The corollary of this is that a lack of political opposition within 
democratic processes indicates a lack of consolidation.
49
 Political 
competition is inextricably linked with political stability because it reflects 
the fact that all major groups have endorsed democratic processes as 
legitimate.  
B. Political Competition and the Public Good 
Political competition is also linked to democratic stability for a more 
practical reason: it provides an incentive for leaders to govern well.
50
 
 
 
governments where alternation is less visible. Id.; see also LIJPHART, GOVERNMENT FORMS AND 
PERFORMANCE, supra note 8, at 10–47 (discussing how these kinds of electoral systems manifest 
political competition in various countries).  
 44. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272.  
 45. Id.  
 46. See GIUSEPPE DI PALMA, TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITIONS 55 (1990).  
 47. DI PALMA, supra note 46, at 55.  
 48. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 9, at 19; DI PALMA, supra note 46, at 55; Jung & Shapiro, supra 
note 9, at 272.  
 49. Dahl, supra note 29, at xvi (―[O]ne is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party 
as very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself; and we take the absence of an 
opposition party as evidence, if not always conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy.‖).  
 50. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272–73 (alluding to the idea that competition may 
create incentives for refined government outputs); Habib & Taylor, supra note 2, at 261–62 
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Meaningful political competition creates the realistic possibility that 
current leadership will be replaced if it does not perform.
51
 An organized 
political opposition presents the public with alternative government 
policies, which can incite public debate and criticism regarding the 
incumbent‘s ineffective practices and policies. This creates an incentive 
for the majority party to deliberate, prospectively, regarding the best 
course of action, which, in turn, creates incentives to avoid making rash 
decisions. All of these dynamics can work together to prevent government 
from adopting minimally vetted policies.
52
  
The existence of an organized political opposition creates a market for 
public policy. It puts pressure on the ruling party to critically evaluate its 
own policies and ensure that it governs prudently and well. In this way, 
political competition can raise the substantive quality of government 
outputs, which, in turn, promotes democratic stability by ensuring that the 
people are satisfied with their government‘s performance.53 This is a 
causal theory. Political competition contributes to democratic stability by 
refining government outputs and therefore reinforcing the legitimacy of 
democratic processes. 
C. Political Competition and Agency Costs 
Political competition is further linked to democratic stability because it 
reduces agency costs inherent in representative government. A major 
problem facing any representative democracy is the incongruence of 
interests between the people and their representatives.
54
 Democracy 
presumes that elected representatives will be accountable to the people. 
Elected representatives are, however, human. They have their own 
 
 
(discussing the purification value of political competition in South Africa as a means of dealing with 
economic crisis).  
 51. See Frederick M. Barnard, Between Opposition and Political Opposition: The Search for 
Competitive Politics in Czechoslovakia, 5 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 533 (1972) (discussing genuine political 
competition as a means of reforming communist Czechoslovakia from within).  
 52. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272–73; see also Hermann Giliomee et al., Dominant 
Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, in OPPOSITION AND DEMOCRACY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 161 (R. Southall ed., 2001) (discussing how political opposition in South Africa could 
perform these functions).  
 53. See generally Christian List & Robert E. Goodin, Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 277 (2001) (discussing how multiple sources of input, 
especially competing sources, in the democratic process can refine democratic outputs); Jeremy 
Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitudes: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s 
Politics, 23 POL. THEORY 563 (1995) (same).  
 54. See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the 
Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 440 (1997) (discussing incongruence of 
interests in representative government).  
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independent interests that may diverge from those of their constituents, 
and, more problematically, representatives are not always able or willing 
to advocate for all of their constituents‘ preferences.55  
Competitive elections provide one means of holding representatives 
accountable.
56
 Challengers have strong incentives to expose political 
corruption and emphasize an incumbent‘s broken promises.57 These 
incentives create, in turn, counter-incentives for incumbents to govern 
honestly and follow through on promises so that they will not be 
vulnerable to defeat come election time. Competitive elections, therefore, 
can reduce agency costs and thereby promote democratic legitimacy.  
However, elections occur relatively infrequently and allow candidates 
to group popular actions with unpopular actions and thereby avoid, to a 
degree, strict political accountability.
58
 One way to recover these residual 
agency costs is to ensure that representatives are required to interact with 
counter-representatives.
59
 Political competition between representatives 
can also play a key role in reducing agency costs. Opposition 
representatives have real continuing incentives to ―ask[] awkward 
questions, shin[e] light in dark places, and expos[e] abuses of power.‖60 
This forces officials to give reasons for and justify their policies, which 
further reduces their ability to pursue their own interests at the people‘s 
expense.
61
 Political competition between representatives can help to ensure 
that ruling elites are kept in check, that they follow through on promises 
 
 
 55. See generally ANNE PHILLIPS, ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY (1991) (discussing the agency 
costs associated with representative democracy); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding 
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 245–
47 (1986) (outlining agency costs associated with representative government).  
 56. See generally Bernard Manin, et al., Elections and Representation, in DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 29 (Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (outlining the basic logic 
underlying electoral systems as a basis of accountability); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, 
Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127 
(2002) (concluding that elections are effective means of holding representatives accountable); Jose 
Antonia Cheibub & Adam Przeworski, Democracy, Elections, and Accountability for Economic 
Outcomes, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 222 (Przeworski et al. eds., 
1999) (discussing elections as means of holding leaders responsible for economic outcomes).  
 57. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272–73.  
 58. John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 55, 132 [hereinafter Ferejohn, Accountability] (discussing other reasons why 
elections are not a complete solution to problem of accountability); see John Dunn, Situating 
Democratic Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, supra note 55, at 329 (discussing problems 
associated with relying exclusively on elections as means of holding representatives accountable); 
Ferejohn, supra note 14 (discussing the problem of agency costs in-between election cycles).  
 59. See Ferejohn, Accountability, supra note 58, at 132 (discussing this alternative).  
 60. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 272.  
 61. Id. at 272–73. 
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made to the public, and that they are attentive to their constituents‘ 
demands and preferences.
62
  
In these ways, political competition minimizes disconnects between the 
people and their government, which reduces the likelihood that the people 
will become dissatisfied with democratic processes, thus promoting 
political stability.
63
 The absence of vibrant political competition represents 
a vulnerability to democracy because elected representatives have few 
incentives to pursue the people‘s interests and preferences over their own 
interests.
64
  
II. THE DIFFICULTY OF FOSTERING POLITICAL COMPETITION IN 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES 
Notwithstanding the tight nexus between political competition and 
democratic stability, emerging democracies face unique circumstances that 
make meaningful political competition difficult. This section focuses on 
two particularly challenging problems faced by emerging democracies.
65
 
The remainder of this Article explores how federalism can help facilitate 
political competition in emerging democracies by overcoming these two 
problems.  
A. Political Opposition and the Exigencies of Political Transition 
Societies that transition from authoritarianism to democracy face many 
challenges. One of those challenges is to prove to the people and 
competing elites that democracy is a more effective form of government 
 
 
 62. Id.  
 63. See generally LIPSET, supra note 27, at 64 (discussing citizen and elites‘ perception of 
effective government as a key variable in democratic stability).  
 64. These benefits of political competition are not democratic luxuries. The absence of political 
competition generally corresponds with political pathologies such as bad government outputs, 
increased dissatisfaction with democratic processes, and government corruption. For a general 
discussion of the pathologies associated with an absence of political competition, see Lawrence 
Schlemmer, Deformations of Political Culture by One-Party Dominance, in CHALLENGES TO 
DEMOCRACY BY ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 117 (Andrea E. Ostheimer 
ed., 2006).  
 65. For a helpful summary of the research regarding the unique problems facing emerging 
democracies, see Michael Bratton, Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 67, 
77–80 (1997) (discussing specific problems facing development of opposition and democratic 
consolidation more generally in emerging democracies). Democratic consolidation in emerging 
democracies is incredibly complicated. Id. The purpose here is not to provide a complete theory of the 
problems facing emerging democracies. Rather, the focus is on those recognized problems that 
federalism is uniquely suited to addressing.  
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than authoritarianism.
66
 This is particularly true regarding economic 
development.
67
 Emerging democracies must demonstrate that they can 
promote economic growth and deliver necessary government services.
68
 
However, this sort of government efficiency and production requires 
cooperation and consensus between powerful elites.
69
 Emerging 
democracies can scarcely afford to be locked in political stalemates and 
power struggles.
70
 They typically have a small window of opportunity to 
demonstrate that democracy, rather than authoritarianism, is the preferred 
form of government.
71
 Thus, the stability of new democratic regimes 
―depends, first, on the ability of the principal political elites—party 
leaders, military leaders, and business leaders—to work together to deal 
with the problems confronting their society.‖72 These pressures create 
incentives for the dominant party to quash opposition groups that fail to 
―get on board.‖  
Another familiar challenge for emerging democracies is the problem of 
―loyal opposition.‖73 By definition, emerging democracies are 
transitioning to democracy from some form of authoritarianism.
74
 This 
means that portions of the society inevitably supported the prior, non-
democratic regime.
75
 This dynamic can blur the all-important line between 
opposition to democratic processes and opposition to the policies and 
 
 
 66. See LIPSET, supra note 27, at 61–72 (discussing connection between government‘s actual 
performance and democratic stability); Larry Diamond et al., Democracy in Developing Countries: 
Facilitating and Obstructing Factors, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 229, 231 (Raymond D. Gastil ed., 1988) (discussing relationship between effectiveness and 
legitimacy). The precise relationship between government effectiveness and stability is not 
uncontested. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 258. However, the basic logic that effectiveness 
undermines legitimacy and contributes to instability remains sound. Id.  
 67. Lipset famously posited this correlation. Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69 (1959); see 
also LIPSET, supra note 27, at 27–58.  
 68. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 258.  
 69. Id.; see Juan Linz & Alfred Stepon, Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or 
Destruction: European and South American Comparisons, in DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS: 
STOPPING THE PENDULUM 41, 58–59 (Robert A. Pastor ed., 1989) (discussing the difficult economic 
conditions facing Colombia and Venezuela and how coordination between elites sustained democratic 
stability in the 1960s).  
 70. HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 257–59. 
 71. Id. at 256–57 (discussing phenomenon of ―authoritarian nostalgia‖ that often follows 
ineffective democratic regimes).  
 72. Id. at 259; see also Habib & Taylor, supra note 2, at 262 (discussing how economic 
effectiveness is fast becoming a primary concern for South Africa‘s democratic consolidation).  
 73. See supra note 10.  
 74. See supra note 6 (discussing definitions of ―authoritarianism,‖ ―democracy,‖ and ―emerging 
democracies‖).  
 75. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 6, at 266–70. 
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actions of the first-elected government.
76
 Consequently, opposition in 
emerging democracies can be a precarious endeavor for political leaders.
77
 
First-elected governments often succumb to the temptation to decry all 
opposition as anti-democratic and pro-authoritarianism.
78
 These political 
circumstances make it difficult for political opposition to be taken 
seriously on the merits and easy for the first-elected government to obtain 
popular support for formal restraints on political opposition.  
However, as discussed above, political competition plays a key role in 
democratic stability because it puts government policies to the test and 
fosters constructive deliberation rather than rash, knee-jerk reactions.
79
 
Emerging democracies desperately need constructive political deliberation 
so that they can bring dangerous social conflicts within democratic 
processes and secure substantively desirable government outputs.
80
 The 
legitimacy of the new democratic order depends, to some extent, on both 
of these things.  
Emerging democracies therefore face polarizing forces. On the one 
hand, they have a genuine need for consensus, compromise, and unity in 
order to meet basic social needs and move their societies away from all-
too-immediate authoritarian pasts. On the other hand, the pathologies 
associated with a lack of political competition may undermine the very 
purpose for which consensus is necessary.
81
 Thus, there is a need for 
institutional arrangements that address these exigencies and provide ways 
for these societies to foster constructive political opposition that does not 
fatally undermine government efficacy and legitimacy.  
 
 
 76. See Michael Bratton & Nicolas Van de Walle, Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa, 46 WORLD POL. 453 (1994) (discussing how antecedent political culture 
dramatically affects success and potency of successive democratic elections).  
 77. Zimbabwe provides a horrifying example of this phenomenon. See Christine Sylvester, 
Whither Opposition in Zimbabwe?, 33 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 403, 407–10 (1995) (discussing overt 
oppression of political opposition and dangers of engaging in political competition within Zimbabwe).  
 78. Id. at 403–04; see also Moore, supra note 10, at 83–87 (discussing this phenomenon in 
context of former Soviet states).  
 79. See supra Part I.B–C.  
 80. Id.; see also Habib & Taylor, supra note 2, at 261–64 (discussing the need for these 
processes in post-apartheid South Africa); Giliomee, et al., supra note 52, at 161 (same); cf. Southall, 
supra note 2, at 65–66 (suggesting mitigating factors that may reduce urgency of need for political 
competition in post-apartheid South Africa).  
 81. See N. Ganesan, Appraising Democratic Developments in Postauthoritarian States: Thailand 
and Indonesia, 28 ASIAN AFF.3, 14 (2001) (discussing tension between economic development and 
political competition in Indonesia and Thailand). See generally Andrew C. Gould, Conflicting 
Imperatives and Concept Formation, 61 REV. POL. 439, 448–49 (1999) (discussing conflict between 
consensus and competitive mobilization as deep problem in theory of state-society relations); 
Schlemmer, supra note 64, at 118–20 (discussing pathologies associated with an absence of political 
competition).  
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B. The Problem of Political Track Records and Voter Behavior in 
Emerging Democracies 
If one looks at a sampling of emerging democracies, a troubling trend 
is visible: voters frequently reelect bad leadership.
82
 This trend has been 
attributed to two challenges facing voters in emerging democracies.  
First, emerging democracies do not have a pool of democratically 
proven leaders or policies from which to draw.
83
 Established democracies 
typically have an entire guild of political professionals who have been 
trained to exercise political power within the confines of constitutional 
constraints and for the public good.
84
 Established democracies also tend to 
have at least some collective experience with a variety of different 
substantive policies.
85
 This diversity of candidates and experiences 
provides voters with multiple points of comparison that they can use to 
legitimately distinguish between candidates and policies within a 
democratic system.
86
 In emerging democracies, on the other hand, political 
candidates will typically have no government experience or will have 
experience operating only within the preexisting authoritarian system.
87
 
Voters and leaders also have no experience with democratically generated 
substantive policies. This means that the first-elected leaders will set the 
bar for the society‘s democratic expectations, and, consequently, voters 
will have no basis by which to judge the performance of their first-elected 
leadership.
88
 A real impediment to democratic competition in emerging 
 
 
 82. Zimbabwe again provides another example, especially during the period while formal legal 
restraints on opposition and overt strong-arm tactics by President Mugabe were relatively 
underdeveloped. See Sylvester, supra note 77, at 407–10; see also GILIOMEE & SIMKINS, supra note 5, 
at 59–69 (discussing this phenomenon in other countries).  
 83. See Bratton & Van de Walle, supra note 76, at 453 (discussing how antecedent political 
culture dramatically affects success and potency of successive democratic elections); Myerson, supra 
note 12, at 4.  
 84. The degree to which leaders live up to these expectations is somewhat irrelevant. The point is 
that the political culture operates on the basis of these ideals. Voters, leaders, and political parties build 
their platforms and form their choices based on reputation and promises that use the language of 
constitutional constraint and the public good.  
 85. This refers to various different economic or social ideologies that are nevertheless compatible 
with democratic process. One can easily think of competing economic ideologies within the U.S. as 
helpful examples.  
 86. This is not to suggest an idealized view of politics in established democracies. The point is 
one of comparison. Within established democracies, comparisons are made based on policy platforms 
that are framed in terms of a theory of public good and a theory of constitutional fidelity. Voters 
discriminate on the basis of these arguments. Within emerging democracies, these arguments are 
usually impossible because of the lack of democratic leaders and because of the voter‘s inability to 
properly respond to democratic political arguments.  
 87. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4.  
 88. See John D. Holm et al., The Development of Civil Society in a Democratic State: The 
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democracies is that voters have no point of reference to use in 
distinguishing between competing candidates and those candidates‘ 
respective substantive policy platforms.
89
  
Second, because emerging democracies do not have a pool of proven 
leaders or tested substantive policies, voters have no reason to expect that 
opposition leaders will behave any differently than incumbents, or that 
opposition policies will be any more effective.
90
 Even if the first-elected 
leadership performs poorly, voters have no credible reason to believe that 
opposition leaders or policies will perform any better. If we accept that 
there are inherent costs associated with replacing incumbent leaders
91—
such as popular loyalty to the first-elected leader because of that leader‘s 
role in overthrowing the authoritarian regime—voters are unlikely to 
replace incumbent leaders with unproven challengers.
92
 
These dynamics can prevent emerging democracies from developing 
vibrant political competition.
93
 They essentially eradicate any competitive 
market for the people‘s vote because the people have no reason to believe 
that replacing the incumbent with an opposition leader will result in 
meaningful political change. Thus, as one theorist has noted, ―the central 
problem for a new democracy may be to create good democratic 
reputations where they have not previously existed.‖94 Once a society 
begins to produce a pool of democratically proven leaders and policies, 
voters have better reason to believe that one leader or policy will be better 
than another. This fosters a competitive market for votes, which sets the 
stage for meaningful political competition and all of its attendant virtues. 
 
 
Botswana Model, 39 AFR. STUD. REV.43 (1996) (discussing how underdeveloped civil society affects 
citizens ability to form political expectations after democratization); see also Bratton & Van de Walle, 
supra note 76, at 453 (discussing how antecedent political regimes impede development of necessary 
democratic skills).  
 89. See PIPPA NORRIS, DEMOCRATIC PHOENIX: REINVENTING POLITICAL ACTIVISM 35–82 
(2002) (conducting an empirical analysis of voter behavior in dominant-party states); Robert Mattes, 
Voter Behaviour and Party Dominance in South Africa: Another View, in CHALLENGES, supra note 64, 
at 105.  
 90. See Sylvester, supra note 77, at 407–10 (discussing this defect in terms of a ―weak civil 
society‖ in Zimbabwe). See generally Jean-François Bayart, Civil Society in Africa, in POLITICAL 
DOMINATION IN AFRICA: REFLECTIONS ON THE LIMITS OF POWER 109, 112 (Patrick Chabal ed., 1986) 
(discussing general problems with under-developed democratic civil societies that result in one-party 
dominance).  
 91. See Myerson, supra note 12, at 4–6.  
 92. Id. at 4–5.  
 93. See Julias E. Nyang‘oro, Reform Politics and the Democratization Process in Africa, 37 AFR. 
STUD. REV. 133 (1994) (discussing information defects in civil society in emerging democracies); 
Peter M. Lewis, Political Transition and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa, 46 J. INT‘L AFF. 31, 
50–54 (1992) (same).  
 94. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4.  
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As discussed below, federalism is uniquely suited to proliferating political 
track records and creating incentives for good governance.  
III. A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMPETITION WITHIN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 
Notwithstanding the real problems facing emerging democracies, there 
has been almost no theoretical research exploring institutional design and 
incentives for constructive political competition.
95
 Some theorists have 
considered the ways in which different electoral systems can affect 
political competition.
96
 Douglas Rae, for example, has concluded that first-
past-the-post electoral systems are likely to produce two-party societies, 
which, in turn, can facilitate strong political opposition in established 
democracies.
97
 There has also been some discussion regarding the 
implications for political competition of consociational electoral systems.
98
 
With the exception of Roger B. Myerson‘s model regarding political 
corruption discussed below, there has been essentially no theoretical 
discussion of the ways that federal arrangements may facilitate or impede 
political competition. This section fills that gap in the literature.  
A. Myerson’s Theory of Character-Based Track Records in Federal 
Regimes 
Myerson crafted a formal game theory model that was addressed to the 
specific problem of political corruption. Myerson‘s formal proof 
demonstrated that federal regimes can promote honest government better 
than unitary regimes because they allow opposition politicians to develop 
independent track records for honesty.
99
 Myerson‘s model is very narrow 
in scope—his express assumptions limit the model‘s applicability solely to 
 
 
 95. Robert Dahl‘s 1966 work remains the seminal authority on political competition and 
democracy. Dahl, supra note 29. Dahl made various conceptual recommendations regarding 
institutional design and political competition. Id. at 351–52. Yet, with the exception of his suggestions 
regarding electoral systems, these suggestions have not been revisited or empirically tested.  
 96. See, e.g., Joel D. Barkan et al., Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for 
Emerging Democracies, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 926 (2006).  
 97. DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (1967); see Jung 
& Shapiro, supra note 9, at 274 (discussing Rae in the context of emerging democracies).  
 98. See Jung & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 273 (concluding that consociational systems work 
against political competition). Consociationalism is often associated with Arend Lijphart‘s articulation 
of a non-territorial based system of decentralized power. See Arend Lijphart, Consociational 
Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 213, 222 (1969); see also ELAZAR, supra note 21, at 18–26 (discussing 
consociationalism).  
 99. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4–5.  
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the issue of corruption in unitary regimes.
100
 However, as discussed more 
fully below, his basic logic can be extrapolated to provide a more general 
theory of political competition in federal regimes if certain key parameters 
are observed. This Article first summarizes Myerson‘s model and 
assumptions and then argues for a different set of parameters that allow for 
an expanded model of political competition in federal regimes.  
1. Myerson’s Basic Logic  
Myerson‘s model addresses the ―chances of success for a new 
democracy‖ where the first set of democratically elected leaders have no 
democratic credentials.
101
 Myerson presents the problem in terms of a 
game theory equilibrium where voters rationally assume that the first 
elected leaders will behave as previous leaders did under the non-
democratic regime.
102
 That is, political leaders will use power and 
resources to benefit elites rather than the voting public.
103
 In a unitary 
state, voters may also rationally assume that other challengers would 
behave the same way because they do not have a proven reputation under 
the new democratic regime.
104
 Thus, when rational voters consider 
transition costs associated with replacing a corrupt national incumbent, 
they have no incentive to replace him and no reason to oppose his 
suppression of political opposition. This results in the first-elected leader 
being repeatedly re-elected, but without any incentive for serving the 
public.
105
  
Myerson concludes that federalism can help to alleviate this problem. 
Federalism can promote political competition by providing opposition 
politicians with opportunities to develop democratic reputations and, 
consequently, enhance the credibility of their opposition platforms.
106
 
Once opposition leaders have developed credible subnational track 
records, voters are more willing to pay the transition costs associated with 
removing an incumbent leader because the challenger‘s track record gives 
voters confidence that his commitment to honesty is credible.
107
 This 
credible threat to corrupt national politicians gives those politicians a 
 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 3–4.  
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Myerson, supra note 12, at 4, 19.  
 106. Id. at 5.  
 107. Id. at 13–14.  
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reciprocal incentive to reform and govern honestly thus fostering 
constructive political competition in the regime as a whole.
108
 
2. Myerson’s Parameters and Assumptions  
Myerson makes various assumptions regarding voter behavior, political 
leadership, and the structure of the federal system. Regarding voters, he 
assumes that they always prefer responsible over corrupt government, but 
they ―perceive some costs or risks of changing the leaders . . . .‖109 Thus, if 
voters suspect that a future leader ―would govern corruptly, then voters 
would rationally re-elect corrupt leaders . . . .‖110 Myerson also assumes 
that voters ―have no disagreements regarding public policy decisions‖ that 
would cause them to rationally vote for corrupt leaders.
111
 Implicit in 
Myerson‘s theory is the further assumption that voters find politicians‘ 
bald promises incredible, but find past performance to be a good indicator 
of future performance.  
Thus, in Myerson‘s model, voters decide whom to vote for based 
entirely on the candidate‘s proven reputation and transition costs of 
installing a new leader. Myerson‘s theory is therefore less likely to apply 
in a system where people vote primarily based on group identities or 
solidarities. The model also does not address the reality of conflicting and 
cross-cutting voter preferences. Myerson assumes that voters will choose 
honest leaders over corrupt leaders regardless of the leader‘s stance on any 
other policy.
112
 This assumption is important when attempting to 
extrapolate Myerson‘s logic beyond its application to government 
corruption.  
Regarding political leadership, Myerson assumes that political leaders 
tend to govern corruptly unless they have an incentive to govern 
responsibly.
113
 He also assumes that, within a federal system, leaders 
always prefer national over subnational office.
114
 When these assumptions 
are combined with Myerson‘s assumptions about voters, subnational 
 
 
 108. Id. at 19–20.  
 109. Id. at 6.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Myerson, supra note 12, at 6. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 6–7 (―[P]olitical leaders would generally prefer to govern corruptly.‖). He accounts for 
the fact that some leaders may be ―intrinsically virtuous.‖ Id. at 8–9. However, he assumes that the 
probability of any challenger being intrinsically virtuous is too small for voters to risk the costs of 
installing a new leader on the hope that the new leader would be intrinsically virtuous. Id. at 9–10. 
Thus, the possibility of a virtuous leader has no real affect on his model.  
 114. Id. at 12.  
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leaders are incentivized to govern responsibly because a positive track 
record could help them ascend to national office.
115
 Responsible 
governance at the subnational level provides a reciprocal incentive for 
national leaders to govern responsibly so as to avoid being replaced by 
subnational leaders.
116
 
Myerson‘s assumptions regarding the nature of the federal system are 
most important for present purposes. He assumes that both national and 
subnational leaders are elected for a fixed term and must run for ―re-
election again in each period until rejected by the voters.‖117 National and 
subnational leaders are assumed to be elected separately.
118
 Myerson 
further assumes that subnational leaders ―exercise independent political 
powers which can be used to demonstrate their qualifications for national 
leadership.‖119  
With these assumptions in place, Myerson‘s logic is clear. Voters 
prefer honest leaders over corrupt leaders. Voters tend to disbelieve 
politicians‘ promises and use past performance to predict future behavior. 
Thus, because of replacement costs, voters will not remove a corrupt 
incumbent leader unless the challenger has a history of honest governance. 
Independent subnational governance provides aspiring national leaders 
with an opportunity to develop track records of honesty that correlate to 
qualities necessary for national leadership. This correlation allows 
subnational leaders to translate their subnational reputation into a credible 
opposition platform at the national level, which, in turn, results in the 
national leadership either reforming itself or being replaced. 
B. Toward a Broader Theory of Political Competition in Federal Regimes 
Political track records can be divided into at least two different types: 
(1) character-based track records, and (2) policy-based track records. As 
used here, a character-based track record refers to a general reputation for 
honest rather than corrupt governance. Policy-based track records refer to 
a party‘s reputation for enacting prudent (and presumably popular) 
substantive policies as well as administrative policies that affect the 
efficient delivery of government services. Policy-based track records also 
 
 
 115. Id. at 19–20. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Myerson, supra note 12, at 7.  
 118. Id. at 21.  
 119. Id. Myerson describes this assumption as the ―key‖ to the model. Id. at 5 (―The key is that 
provincial leaders exercise real governmental power, and their hopes of rising to national leadership 
can increase their incentive to use this power responsibly.‖).  
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include a party‘s qualifications for and proven competence in policy-
making and administrative responsibilities. Myerson applies his theory 
only to character-based track records.
120
 This section argues that 
Myerson‘s basic logic can be applied to policy-based track records if we 
account for three new variables: (1) institutional independence; (2) voter 
priorities; and (3) qualitatively comparable responsibilities.  
1. Institutional Independence 
When examined closely, Myerson‘s model depends on the degree of 
institutional separation between national and subnational government.
121
 
Without sufficient independence, it becomes difficult for subnational 
leaders to develop marketable reputations. If subnational leaders do not 
have some degree of visible independence from the center, they will not be 
able to take credit for good subnational governance because national 
leadership will be able to make an equal claim to their good performance. 
Additionally, as subnational leaders develop good reputations, national 
leaders will have incentives to exercise control over them so as to limit 
political competition and take credit for their performances.
122
  
Because Myerson‘s model is concerned only with character-based track 
records, these issues are resolved by his stated assumption that subnational 
leaders are separately elected by voters rather than appointed by national 
leadership.
123
 Separate elections provide the minimum amount of 
independence necessary for subnational leaders to develop independent 
character-based track records. All government officials within a federal 
democracy presumably have the volitional capacity and a legal obligation 
to reject bribes. If subnational leaders are appointed by the center, national 
leadership can put pressure on subnational leaders to act corruptly.
124
 Even 
if appointed subnational leaders act honestly, national leadership could 
take some credit for this because it made the appointment.
125
 If subnational 
leaders are separately elected, however, they have no reason to fear 
removal by national leadership and they can take sole credit for their 
honesty. Thus, even if subnational leaders have little or no policy 
independence from the center, they may still be able to build a marketable 
 
 
 120. Id. at 6. Although he does not define corruption, he expressly excludes policy-based voter 
preferences and eliminates the significance of intrinsically virtuous leaders from his model. Id. 
 121. Id. at 20.  
 122. Id. at 21.  
 123. Myerson, supra note 12, at 21. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id.  
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reputation by simply being honest—as long as they are separately 
elected.
126
 Myerson‘s model turns on this assumption.  
If Myerson‘s model is to be applied to positive track records on issues 
other than corruption, subnational leaders must have a degree of 
independence from the center regarding those issues. If the rules of a 
federal regime are such that the center has the power to effectively 
preempt or control subnational policy, Myerson‘s track-record model will 
not work because as soon as subnational leaders begin to develop positive 
policy reputations, national leadership will preempt or undermine those 
policies.
127
 To extrapolate Myerson‘s theory, therefore, we must assume 
that the federal regime provides some formal policy independence for 
subnational leaders, as well as mechanisms for subnational leaders to 
enforce their independence.  
2. Voter Priorities 
Institutional independence must also overlap with voter priorities. 
Myerson assumes that voters have only one priority: replacing corrupt 
leaders with leaders that have a reputation for honesty.
128
 This assumption 
drives his logic. Subnational leaders become a credible threat to national 
leaders only if voters intend to promote honest subnational leaders to 
national office, which, under Myerson‘s assumptions, they will always do. 
If we extrapolate Myerson‘s model to apply to multiple issues, it will work 
only if we assume that voters are willing to replace any national leader that 
does not deliver on analogous issues or competencies. This may be a 
dubious assumption when multiple issues are involved because those 
issues can cut in different directions and voters are likely to prioritize 
issues in a variety of ways.  
Thus, in broadening Myerson‘s model to apply to policy-based track 
records, we must be aware of the fact that different track records represent 
different amounts of political capital depending on voter priorities. 
Furthermore, the rules of a federal regime determine what kinds of 
independent track records a subnational leader can develop. Many federal 
regimes entrust subnational leaders with independent authority for a 
 
 
 126. Id.  
 127. As a practical matter, national leadership could simply preempt subnational substantive 
policies that deviate from policies set at the center before they could be implemented.  
 128. Id. at 6.  
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variety of administrative and policy-making responsibilities.
129
 If 
performance in these areas is important to voters, and the rules of the 
federal system protect subnational leaders‘ independence in these areas, 
subnational leaders may be able to develop policy-based track records that 
they can use to challenge national leadership.  
In sum, the effectiveness of Myerson‘s model as applied to policy-
based track records depends on a degree of overlap between subnational 
independence (as secured by the specific regime‘s rules) and voter 
priorities.
130
 The model can be extended to other kinds of track-records if 
the federal regime protects subnational leaders‘ independence in areas that 
are important to national voters (or at least analogous to issues that are 
important to national voters).  
3. Qualitatively Comparable Responsibilities 
Implicit in Myerson‘s model is the idea that subnational governance is 
sufficiently analogous to national governance such that if subnational 
leaders are qualified for their positions, they will also be qualified for 
national positions.
131
 However, this is not necessarily the case in many 
federal regimes.
132
 Responsibilities of subnational governors can range 
from extensive to menial. The degree to which subnational track records 
can aid in fostering political competition depends, in part, on whether 
subnational governance is qualitatively comparable to national 
governance.
133
 The more that a track record demonstrates relevant 
qualifications for national leadership, the more effective that track record 
will be in fostering political competition.
134
 It seems obvious that the more 
 
 
 129. The basic structure of the American system federal system is illustrative. The Tenth 
Amendment reserves to the states all substantive policy responsibilities that are not expressly 
delegated to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 130. Subnational independence can no doubt help in shaping voter preferences. An honest 
subnational leader, for example, may raise voter awareness regarding the extent of corruption at the 
center. But this does not change the fact that underlying socioeconomic conditions usually dictate 
election issues and the rules of a federal regime determine what sort of track record a subnational 
leader is able to develop.  
 131. Myerson makes this assumption explicit when he discusses the possibility that local 
government track records could have the same effect as provincial government track records. Myerson, 
supra note 12, at 21. However, he seems to assume that provincial government responsibilities will 
always be ―qualitatively comparable‖ to national responsibilities. Id.  
 132. See John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries, 39 
RUTGERS L.J. 837 (2008) (exploring substantive competencies of subnational leadership in a variety of 
different federal systems); Ronald L. Watts, Forward: States, Provinces, Länder, and Cantons: 
International Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941 (2000) (same).  
 133. Myerson, supra note 12, at 21. 
 134. Id.  
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power subnational leaders have, the more valuable their track records will 
be. Thus, the real-world applicability of Myerson‘s logic may depend on 
its applicability to policy-based track records, which presumably reflect a 
leader‘s positive ability to govern well rather than his ability to avoid 
corruption.  
C. Federalism as a Means of Moderating the Exigencies of Political 
Transition 
The model developed above is directed to the impediments to political 
competition created by the information problems facing first-time voters in 
an emerging democracy. Federalism can also promote political 
competition by addressing other exigent circumstances such as the 
problem of ―loyal opposition‖ and the need to avoid political stalemates 
that will undermine government efficiency.
135
 
Regarding the problem of loyal opposition, federalism, by definition, 
creates separate legal spheres of governance. This creates the possibility 
that opposition leaders can develop their own independent policies and 
track records without coming into direct conflict with the majority 
leadership. This creates a comfortable scenario for both opposition and 
majority leadership because they are able to exert influence and develop 
independent records without the appearance of direct confrontation, thus 
diffusing any concerns regarding loyalty to democratic processes.
136
  
Regarding the urgent need for consensus and cooperation between 
elites, federalism eliminates the zero-sum game created by a unitary 
regime. In a unitary system, disputing groups are faced with an all-or-
nothing scenario: one party or coalition gets to decide all substantive 
policy issues via the central government. By creating separate spheres of 
governance, federalism diffuses this dangerous power dichotomy and 
creates the possibility that some issues and policies can be devolved to 
subnational governance where opposition parties may have more 
consolidated support. Providing opposition parties with an independent 
 
 
 135. See supra Part II.A discussing these issues.  
 136. Dahl seems to have recognized federalism‘s potential in this regard back in 1965. Dahl 
observed that ―constitutional separation of powers and federalism both create a variety of alternative 
sites and reduce the possibility of an all-or-nothing victory through elections; hence both tend to 
decrease the relative importance of electoral encounters . . . .‖ Dahl, supra note 29, at 350. Dahl 
concluded, however, that federalism impeded political competition by reducing electoral stakes. Id. at 
351. The application here is that federalism can facilitate competition in emerging democracies 
because reducing electoral stakes creates a counter-incentive for the dominant party to quash all 
opposition. It is also worth nothing that Dahl‘s idea has gone largely unnoticed and undeveloped since 
1965.  
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sphere of governance can actually facilitate consolidation by channeling 
them into subnational democratic institutions rather than alienating them 
from the new political order entirely. However, this solution also promotes 
competition because it gives opposition parties a simultaneous opportunity 
to demonstrate to the public that their policies and leadership are efficient 
and trustworthy.  
These possibilities reduce incentives for the dominant party to quash all 
political opposition because they create an alternative: decentralization. 
Obviously, this model works effectively only if opposition parties are able 
to obtain control of at least one subnational unit. The crucial theoretical 
point, however, is that federalism creates a possible compromise that is 
impossible in a unitary regime.
137
 
IV. SOUTH AFRICA‘S FEDERAL STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER-BASED 
TRACK RECORDS 
The remaining sections explore whether South Africa‘s federal 
structure is conducive to promoting political competition pursuant to the 
above model and, if so, whether South Africa‘s experience provides 
empirical support for the model‘s theoretical claims. This section 
considers whether the rules governing South Africa‘s federal system allow 
for subnational politicians to develop character-based track records that 
could facilitate political competition pursuant to Myerson‘s model. The 
section first analyzes the formal election rules and the rules governing the 
relationship between national and subnational leadership. It then considers 
some open empirical issues and strategic alternatives regarding those rules 
that may impact the effectiveness of Myerson‘s model.  
A. South Africa’s Electoral System 
South Africa‘s electoral system can likely accommodate subnational 
character-based track records. South Africa‘s federal structure consists of 
three basic levels of government: national, provincial, and local.
138
 
Political powers at all levels derive from and are circumscribed by the 
 
 
 137. I have previously examined South Africa as a test case for a variant of this theory and 
explored the precise circumstances under with it is most likely to be effective in promoting democratic 
consolidation. See Marshfield, supra note 24, at 625–29. Thus, I do not revisit this empirical research 
here. Rather, the remainder of this Article explores whether South Africa‘s experience presents 
evidence of the voter-based model of political competition developed above.  
 138. See generally I.M. RAUTENBACH & E.F.J. MALHERBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 268–70 (4th 
ed. 2004) (providing overview of South Africa‘s federal structure).  
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National Constitution (NC).
139
 The NC creates nine provinces and 
establishes legislative and parliamentary-executive branches in each 
province.
140
 Local government consists of 300 municipalities that are 
governed by Municipal Councils.
141
 The national legislature (Parliament) 
is bicameral and composed of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of the Provinces (NCOP).
142
 The NCOP consists of delegates 
from the provinces and exists exclusively to represent provincial interests 
in the national legislative process.
143
 The national government further 
consists of a parliamentary-executive and an independent judiciary.
144
 
South Africa has a parliamentary, party-based electoral system. 
National and provincial elections are held concurrently every five years.
145
 
Municipal elections are held separately every five years.
146
 Registered 
political parties may contest the national election; any or all of the 
 
 
 139. Rassie Malherbe & Dirk Brand, South Africa: Sub-National Constitutional Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1, 48–65 (Andre Alen, et al. eds., 2001) (describing South Africa as a devolutionary federal 
system where residual powers belong to national government); see also In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) para. 14 (S. Afr.) (holding 
that provinces are ―recipients and not the source of power.‖).  
 140. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 103(1) (establishing nine provinces); id. § 104 (establishing 
provincial legislative branches); id. § 125 (establishing provincial executive branches). The provinces 
are not permitted to have their own judicial branches. In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Province of KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC) para. 33 (S. Afr.). Provinces are permitted to 
adopt constitutions, but this is largely a formality because the National Constitution establishes all the 
―particulars‖ necessary for provincial government to function and does not permit Provincial 
Constitutions to deviate from the NC‘s design in any significant way. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, 
supra note 138, at 244 n.22; see In re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1997 (9) 
BCLR 1167 (CC) para. 15 (S. Afr.) (―[The NC] provides a complete blueprint for the regulation of 
government within provinces which proves adequately for the establishment and functioning of 
provincial legislatures and executives.‖). 
 141. The NC requires Parliament to provide for a national system of local governance. S. AFR. 
CONST., 1996 § 151(1). The boundaries and particulars of local government are laid out in the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act and the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act. See 
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 280–81.  
 142. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 42.  
 143. Id. §§ 60–72.  
 144. Id. §§ 83–102 (executive); id. §§ 165–80 (judiciary).  
 145. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 49 (election of Parliament to five-year terms); id. § 108 (election of 
provincial legislatures for five-year terms). The NC allows for Parliament and provincial legislatures 
to be dissolved separately by a majority vote of the respective bodies if the dissolving body has been in 
service for at least three years. Id. § 109 (dissolution of provincial legislatures); id. § 50 (dissolution of 
Parliament). An election must be held within ninety (90) days of dissolution. Id. § 108 (election after 
dissolution of provincial legislatures); id. § 49 (election after dissolution of Parliament). Thus, it is 
possible that provincial and national elections could be held separately. However, because dissolution 
is only likely to occur as a result of coalition governments, which in turn implies meaningful political 
competition, the Article treats this possibility as too remote while the ANC retains a stronghold on 
Parliament.  
 146. The NC provides that municipal government may be elected to five-year terms but allows 
Parliament to shorten the term. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 159.  
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provincial or municipal elections; or any combination of municipal, 
provincial, or national elections. Before an election, registered political 
parties must submit official candidate lists for each election that the party 
will contest.
147
 Each candidate list must identify candidates in the order of 
the party‘s preference.148 The NC prohibits candidates from holding 
positions in both the National Assembly and a provincial legislature.
149
  
On election day for national and provincial governments, voters receive 
separate national and provincial ballots.
150
 The ballots display a list of 
registered political parties with a corresponding picture of the parties‘ 
first-choice candidate.
151
 Voters cast a single vote for a political party at 
the national level and a separate vote for a single party at the provincial 
level.
152
 The 400 seats in the National Assembly are assigned based on a 
constituency system.
153
 There are ten constituencies: one for each of the 
nine provinces and one assigned to the national vote at large.
154
 The 
provincial constituencies receive 200 seats, which are divided 
proportionally among the provinces based on population.
155
 The remaining 
200 seats are assigned to parties based on their proportional share of the 
national vote at large.
156
  
Seats in the provincial legislatures are assigned based solely on the 
number of provincial-ballot votes each party received.
157
 Municipal 
council seats are similarly assigned based on the number of municipal-
ballot votes each party received.
158
 Seats at all levels of government are 
filled by the individuals identified on the parties‘ candidate lists in the 
order listed by the parties.
159
 
 
 
 147. The ―list system‖ is established by national legislation (the Electoral Act). The NC requires 
only that election rules be based on a ―national common voters roll[],‖ ―provide[] for a minimum 
voting age of 18 years,‖ and ―result[], in general, in proportional representation.‖ S. AFR. CONST., 
1996 § 46; see RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120–21 (describing the particulars of 
the electoral rules).  
 148. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120.  
 149. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 158.  
 150. See Murray Faure, Elections for Parliament and the Provinces in the New South Africa: 
1994–2004, 2 AFR. ASS‘N POL. SCI. 70, 72–75 (1997). 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120.  
 154. Id. at 120–21.  
 155. Id.  
 156. Id.  
 157. This is prescribed by national legislation. Id. at 246.  
 158. Id. at 280–81. Local government may also include ―participation‖ by certain non-elected 
traditional leaders. See id. at 270–71. However, a local government body may not consist of more than 
20% traditional leadership. Id. at 271, 281.  
 159.  RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 120–21. Municipalities may choose to 
operate under a ―ward system‖ rather than the ―list system.‖ Id. at 281.  
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The National Assembly elects one of its members to serve as the 
President and may remove the President by a vote of no-confidence.
160
 
Provincial legislatures similarly elect one of their members to be Premier 
and may remove the Premier by a vote of no-confidence.
161
 The National 
Assembly and provincial legislatures serve for concurrent five-year terms, 
unless dissolved by a vote of no-confidence.
162
 The President and 
provincial Premiers must be reelected at the beginning of every legislative 
term and no individual may serve more than two consecutive terms as 
Premier or President.
163
  
The Constitution does not provide for either the President or Parliament 
to directly remove provincial officials from office.
164
 However, the 
national executive may intervene in provincial administration if a 
provincial executive fails to ―fulfill an executive obligation in terms of the 
Constitution or legislation.‖165 The national executive may issue a 
directive ordering compliance or may assume responsibility for the 
obligation directly if necessary to protect national interests.
166
 This 
mechanism could conceivably allow a corrupt national executive to 
exercise authority over an honest provincial executive.
167
 Provincial 
government exercises considerably more control over municipal 
government, but municipal council members are nevertheless separately 
elected and not subject to removal by provincial or national leadership.
168
  
Viewed in total, South Africa‘s federal system would seem to allow for 
independent subnational character-based track records as envisioned by 
Myerson. National and subnational leaders are separately elected for fixed 
terms, may not be removed by national leadership, and are not directly 
responsible to national leadership. Additionally, the National Assembly‘s 
constituency-based electoral system means that opposition parties can gain 
more seats in the National Assembly if their support is consolidated within 
particular provinces rather than spread evenly over the country at large. 
 
 
 160. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 86, 102.  
 161. Id. § 128.  
 162. See supra note 145.  
 163. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 88 (president); id. § 130 (premier).  
 164. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 105, 108, 128 (providing that provincial officials are separately 
elected to five-year terms unless they are dissolved by a vote of no-confidence); RAUTENBACH & 
MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 267 (discussing national government‘s limited powers of intervention 
regarding provincial government).  
 165. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 100(1); see RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 267.  
 166. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 100(1).  
 167. Myerson, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing how mechanisms for imposing pressure on 
subnational leaders can affect their independence and dull incentives for building independent track 
records).  
 168. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 276–77.  
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This would seem to provide an additional incentive for opposition parties 
to develop strong provincial and municipal track records. In light of 
growing suspicion regarding the integrity of the ANC and that of its top 
leaders, this may prove to be a valuable feature of South Africa‘s federal 
structure.
169
 In fact, as discussed in Part VIII below, opposition parties 
capitalized on this structural feature during the 2009 election.  
B. Strategic Alternatives Affecting Myerson’s Model 
South Africa‘s electoral rules nevertheless present opposition parties 
with several strategic alternatives that may affect their ability to foster 
independent character-based track records. For example, opposition parties 
must decide whether to list their most prominent leader as a candidate for 
the National Assembly or as a candidate for a particular provincial 
legislature.
170
 In light of the ANC‘s majority in the National Assembly, 
opposition leaders will have little or no real power in the National 
Assembly. Under Myerson‘s model, a more prudent strategy for 
opposition parties is to focus on obtaining a majority in a provincial 
legislature. This would enable them to exercise power independent of the 
ANC and develop an independent provincial track record.
171
 This requires 
opposition party leadership to resist the prestige of the National Assembly 
and concentrate on a long-term reputation-building strategy within a low-
profile provincial legislature.  
This is a choice that most regional opposition parties have been unable 
to make. For example, in 1994, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) sent 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, its internationally known leader, to the National 
Assembly even though it anticipated winning a majority in the KwaZulu-
Natal legislature and the ANC was sure to win a majority in the National 
Assembly.
172
 That same year, President de Kerk‘s National Party (NP) 
 
 
 169. See Jonathan Hyslop, Political Corruption: Before and After Apartheid, 31 J. S. AFR. STUD. 
773, 789 (2005) (examining extent and nature of corruption in post-apartheid South Africa).  
 170. Only ninety percent (90%) of a party‘s listed candidates for a provincial legislature need to 
reside within that province. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 246 n.1.  
 171. This strategy is viable only if the opposition party has consolidated support within specific 
provinces such that it can obtain a majority in those provincial legislatures.
 
The Congress of the People 
(COPE), for example, which finished third in the 2009 national election, did not win control of any 
provincial legislatures. See IEC Results, supra note 3; see also infra Part VIII.B–C (discussing the 
geographic distribution of COPE‘s constituency).  
 172. This was particularly ironic because the IFP was the dominant proponent for decentralization 
during the constitutional negotiations and the KwaZulu-Natal legislature became the venue for a 
regime-threatening conflict between the IFP and ANC between 1994 and 1996. Marshfield, supra note 
24, at 632–38 (discussing the role of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature in the negotiated 
transition to democracy).  
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faced similar prospects regarding its success in the Western Cape 
provincial legislature. The NP nevertheless sent de Klerk to the National 
Assembly.
173
 However, in 2009, the Democratic Alliance (DA) became 
the first party to list its president as a candidate for a provincial legislature 
(Western Cape) rather than the National Assembly.
174
 Indeed, it appears 
that the DA has adopted a deliberate strategy to build a strong provincial 
track record upon which to challenge the ANC in the 2014 election.
175
 
These examples illustrate that South Africa‘s electoral system provides 
opposition parties with an important strategic decision, which represents 
an added variable affecting whether Myerson‘s model is likely to play out 
constructively in South Africa.  
C. Open Empirical Questions Affecting Myerson’s Model 
South Africa‘s electoral rules also raise various empirical questions 
that bring into question whether Myerson‘s model is likely to materialize 
in South Africa.  
First, Myerson‘s model would seem to work most effectively in a 
presidential rather than parliamentary system. The model works best when 
voters are keenly dialed in to the character of the leader for whom they are 
voting. Although party reputations surely play a role in voter choice in 
presidential systems, a candidate‘s individual reputation would seem to be 
more at issue in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system. In a 
parliamentary system, the primary focus is the party‘s collective 
reputation, which, because of its corporate nature, is more difficult for 
voters to track and is more malleable by the party.
176
 Additionally, in a 
 
 
 173. De Klerk and Buthelezi‘s involvement in the first national government was incredibly 
symbolic. In an effort to set the tone for reconciliation and cooperation, the ANC agreed to a provision 
in the Interim Constitution that extended executive cabinet posts to any opposition party that obtained 
twenty or more seats in the National Assembly. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 § 88. De Klerk and 
Buthelezi both assumed posts in Nelson Mandela‘s cabinet. This cooperation between three previously 
bitter rivals was extraordinary. These circumstances perhaps explain and justify the NP and IFP‘s 
decisions to send their prominent leaders to the national government rather than focus on provincial 
track records.  
 174. See infra Part VIII.B–C (discussing DA‘s opposition strategies in the 2009 election).  
 175. See Democratic Alliance, A Strong Track Record in Government, http://www.da.org.za/ 
campaigns.htm?action=view-page&category=6592 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). This was also the 
stated strategy of the DA‘s predecessor, the Democratic Party. See Adam Habib & Lubna Nadvi, Party 
Disintegrations & Re-Alignments in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 29 REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 331 
(2002).  
 176. Myerson discusses a variation on his model that accounts for voters‘ inability to observe 
corruption in leaders. See Myerson, supra note 12, at 18. This variation is somewhat analogous to the 
point here. Myerson‘s variation deals primarily with the idea that corruption can be hidden by leaders, 
but the decrease in voter welfare will serve as a proxy for leader corruption. Id. The point is that 
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presidential system, voters are the primary means of holding individual 
executives accountable. Executives receive their mandate from the voters 
and, consequently, structure their campaigns around voter preferences. 
Thus, if voters demand integrity, executive candidates will have to proffer 
evidence of personal integrity. In a parliamentary system, however, the 
executive is accountable primarily to the majority party or coalition that 
controls the legislature, and party support is often driven by patronage, not 
personal integrity.  
This disconnect between the voters and the executive could dull the 
incentives that are so crucial to Myerson‘s model. Executives in a 
parliamentary system may have less of an incentive to develop a strong 
character-based track record, because their success is tied directly to party 
rather than voter support. Thus, they may actually tend toward corruption 
in order to curry political favor within the party. Likewise, voters in a 
parliamentary system may find it more difficult to isolate culpability for 
corruption since campaigns are structured around the collective reputation 
of the party rather than individual candidates. 
Perhaps anticipating this criticism of his model, Myerson notes in a 
parenthetical that his model will nevertheless work in a parliamentary 
system ―provided that . . . leadership selection is understood as the primary 
function of parliamentary elections.‖177 This caveat is not unrealistic. Even 
in a parliamentary system, if voters demand virtue from their leaders, 
political parties will have an incentive to elect individuals that have 
reputations for honesty and to expel corrupt leaders from the party.  
South Africa‘s electoral rules are configured to promote this because 
they require parties to list all candidates in order of preference before any 
election.
178
 Party reputations are therefore publicly linked to the individual 
reputations of the listed candidates—particularly the reputation of the first-
choice candidate, who is presumably the party‘s selection for President or 
Premier. Nevertheless, the legislature‘s ultimate selection for Premier or 
President is never certain and the majority party can remove the President 
or Premier at any time by a no-confidence vote.  
Thus, the parliamentary nature of South Africa‘s electoral system raises 
the empirical question of how tight the nexuses are between candidates‘ 
 
 
parliamentary systems create an added layer between voters and corruption that could make it more 
difficult for voters to track culpability and easier for parties to mask corruption. It is a variation on the 
agency problem flagged by Myerson.  
 177. Id. at 11.  
 178. This requirement is strictly enforced by the Independent Electoral Commission. See ANC, 
DA and COPE make candidate list cut-off, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http://www. 
mg.co.za/article/2009-03-02-anc-and-da-make-candidate-list-cutoff.  
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personal track records, collective reputations of political parties, and 
public choice regarding parliamentary elections. If these connections are 
weak and voters do not see executive ―leadership selection as the primary 
function of parliamentary elections,‖179 Myerson‘s character-based model 
may break down, or, at the very least, the incentives will be less 
pronounced.  
A second empirical issue that affects Myerson‘s model in South Africa 
is whether holding concurrent national and provincial elections affects 
voters‘ tendency to cast their subnational vote independent of their 
national vote.
180
 As described below, the provinces‘ substantive policy-
making authority is nominal, and most high-profile issues are decided at 
the national level.
181
 This means that national elections can easily 
dominate provincial elections. An important empirical question is whether 
voters can critically evaluate provincial candidates in their own right or 
whether voter preferences regarding the national election tend to dictate 
how voters cast their provincial vote. The party-based parliamentary 
system may also play a role here, because it is easy to imagine that voters 
will have difficulty identifying a credible basis for splitting their 
provincial and national ballots between different political parties.
182
 
Myerson‘s model only works if voters cast their national and subnational 
votes independently. South Africa‘s concurrent electoral system may 
result in a de facto blending of national and provincial votes 
notwithstanding the formality of separate ballots.  
A third empirical question is whether national prosecution of provincial 
leadership could effectively squelch any independent provincial track 
records.
183
 Neither the President nor the National Assembly has authority 
to directly remove a provincial representative or Premier from office. 
However, the President‘s cabinet is vested with significant discretion and 
 
 
 179. Myerson, supra note 12, at 11.  
 180. It is interesting that during the negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy, the ANC 
advocated for a single-ballot electoral system. Andrew Reynolds, South Africa: Electoral System 
Design and Conflict Management, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL 
ASSISTANCE, http://www.idea.int/esd/upload/south_africa.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). Under the 
ANC‘s proposal, provincial and national representation would have been determined by a single vote 
for a single political party. This proposal was a transparent strategic move by the ANC to take 
advantage of its national dominance. Id. at 69–70. The ANC‘s position was ultimately rejected in favor 
of the split-ballot system described above. Id. at 70. Significantly, results from the 1994 election 
showed that many voters did in fact split their national and provincial votes between parties. Id.  
 181. See infra Parts V–VI.  
 182. There is some empirical evidence that voters split their votes. See Reynolds, supra note 180, 
at 69–70 (analyzing results from the 1994 election).  
 183. Myerson raises this as a possible empirical issue affecting his model. Myerson, supra note 
12, at 21.  
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ultimate authority regarding criminal prosecution of government 
corruption.
184
 Provincial leadership is not immune from investigation and 
prosecution by national law-enforcement and intelligence agencies.
185
 
Findings from a recent report regarding government corruption and 
prosecution in South Africa do not suggest that the national government 
has systematically used this power as a means of eliminating political 
competition.
186
 Nevertheless, the possibility of strategic prosecutions by 
national leadership of subnational competition exists under South Africa‘s 
structure. This sort of behavior could affect the real-world independence 
of subnational leaders to challenge national leadership through the 
development of subnational track records. 
V. THE PROVINCES‘ LAW-MAKING AUTHORITY AND POLICY-BASED 
TRACK RECORDS 
South Africa‘s federal structure may also allow subnational leaders to 
develop policy-based track records. As noted above, the key to expanding 
the model to policy-based track records is that the subnational units retain 
a degree of independence from the national government on issues that can 
be used to mount a meaningful campaign against national leadership.
187
 
This section explores the degree to which South Africa‘s federal structure 
may be able to accommodate this broader theory of political competition 
within federal systems. 
A. The Provinces’ Formal Law-Making Authority 
The ability of provincial leaders to develop policy-based track records 
is significantly limited by the fact that the provinces have almost no 
independent policy-making or taxing authority. Provincial legislatures 
may only make laws concerning specific issues listed in the NC.
188
 The 
NC lists only twelve rather insignificant substantive areas where the 
 
 
 184. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 179(6).  
 185. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME: REGIONAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH AFRICA & SOUTH 
AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY CORRUPTION REPORT: 
SOUTH AFRICA (April 2003) (describing the prosecutorial structure in South Africa).  
 186. Id. at 52–54 (presenting statistics regarding corruption prosecutions without any suspicious 
regional patterns or marked increase in prosecutions).  
 187. See supra Part III.B (discussing this in terms of three variables: institutional independence, 
voter priorities, and qualitatively comparable responsibilities).  
 188. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 104; In re Certification of the Constitution of the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 at (CC) para. 14 (S. Afr.); see Marshfield, supra note 24, at 
590–95 (providing detailed legal analysis of provinces‘ law-making authority).  
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provinces have exclusive law-making authority.
189
 The three most notable 
powers are the regulation of liquor licenses, roads, and land use 
planning.
190
 However, Parliament may override provincial legislation in 
any of these areas if ―necessary‖ to ―maintain economic unity,‖ ―maintain 
essential national standards,‖ or ―to prevent unreasonable action taken by a 
province which is prejudicial to another province or to the country as a 
whole.‖191 The Constitutional Court has interpreted these requirements 
liberally and universally upheld preemptive national legislation.
192
 
The NC provides a more generous list of issues over which provincial 
legislatures and Parliament have concurrent law-making authority.
193
 
Some of the more significant issues on the list include education, the 
environment, health services, and welfare services.
194
 Provinces may enact 
laws in these areas, but Parliament has complete discretion to preempt any 
provincial law with national legislation.
195
 Provinces therefore have 
absolutely no formal independence on these issues. They are only 
permitted to make law if the national leadership, by acquiescence, permits 
them to do so.  
A further practical limitation on the law-making authority of the 
provinces is their inability to collect meaningful taxes. The provinces may 
not assess any sales, property, income, or value-added tax.
196
 Provinces are 
therefore dependent on distributions from the national government in order 
to implement any laws that they make.
197
 Parliament is constitutionally 
required to provide provinces with funds sufficient to perform ―basic 
services‖ and implement any national legislation that Parliament delegates 
to provincial executives, which Parliament can do without limitation.
198
 
Thus, because the provinces are not entitled to any funding for 
 
 
 189. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 104, sched. 5, pt. A.  
 190. Id. Less notable powers include provincial sport, ―abattoirs,‖ ―provincial cultural matters,‖ 
and provincial archives. Id.  
 191. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 44(2).  
 192. Cape Metro. Council v. Minister of Prov. Affairs and Constitutional Dev. 1999 (11) BCLR 
1229 (CC); Weare v. Ndebele NO 2009 (4) BCLR 370 (CC); Nhlabathi v. Fick 2003 (9) ZALCC 
(LCC).  
 193. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 104, sched. 4, pt. A.  
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. §§ 104, 146–50.  
 196. Id. § 228.  
 197. Id. § 227(1)(a); see Tom Lodge, Provincial Government and State Authority in South Africa, 
31 J. S. AFR. STUD. 738, 740–41 (2005) (discussing the provinces‘ dependence on national funds).  
 198. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 227(1)(a).  
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independent provincial programs, they are very limited in their ability to 
enact and implement meaningful provincial legislation.
199
  
This lack of substantive law-making independence suggests that South 
Africa‘s structure cannot support a strict application of the model 
developed here. Although the provinces certainly make substantive laws, 
the provinces have no effective means of fending off national preemption. 
Indeed, the system is purposefully set up to favor national legislation and 
permit provinces to make law only as Parliament sees fit.
200
 Parliament is 
well within its constitutional authority to enact preemptive legislation, 
impose burdensome national legislation that consumes provincial 
resources, or simply withhold necessary funds so that provinces are unable 
to enact meaningful legislation. All of these devices enable national 
leadership to control whether a province can deviate from national policy 
choices. Without independent authority to enact deviant policies, 
subnational leaders cannot develop policy-based track records that 
challenge the national leaders‘ incompetence.201 
B. The Provinces’ De Facto Policy-Making Independence as Illustrated 
by the HIV/AIDS Controversy 
The previous discussion assumes that national leadership is 
consolidated and able to act unanimously in imposing national policy. 
Under those circumstances, and if we assume that national leadership will 
always preempt ―undesirable‖ subnational law, provincial leadership lacks 
the ability to develop independent policy-based track records. However, if 
the ANC were to be divided on a particular issue that would also be within 
the province‘s law-making authority, then provinces could enjoy de facto 
independence from national preemption and craft their own policy 
 
 
 199. See Lodge, supra note 197, at 740–41 (discussing financial limitations on independent 
provincial policy). 
 200. In the words of the Constitutional Court, South Africa‘s ―constitutional structure . . . makes 
provision for framework provisions to be set by the national sphere of government.‖ Cape Metro. 
Council 1999 (11) BCLR 1229 (CC) para. 50.  
 201. It should be noted that this analysis focuses on the formal logic of the proposed model. The 
point is that provinces have no means of fending off national preemption. According to the model, this 
means that the national leaders will be able to squelch opposition track records, thus short-circuiting 
the incentives necessary for the model to work. In reality, it is possible that the ANC could, for any 
number of reasons, not want to preempt provincial authority even though provincial parties were 
developing good track records. If the ANC were to exercise this sort of restraint because of some other 
incentive, the model may still work. The point here, however, is that the formal rules of South Africa‘s 
federal system do not guarantee the necessary level of independence for provinces to develop 
independent policy-based track records. Part VIII below discusses the way that political opposition has 
in fact developed in South Africa within the confines of this legal structure.  
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solutions. This could have positive effects for political competition 
because opposition parties would have the opportunity to demonstrate 
their abilities to adopt and implement sound provincial policies on issues 
of obvious public importance.
202
 If these provincial policies were 
successful, opposition parties would have a marketable policy-based track 
record regarding a high-profile issue.  
President Thabo Mbeki‘s controversial position on HIV/AIDS provides 
a powerful illustration.
203
 Beginning in 2002, President Mbeki took the 
rather bizarre position that HIV was not proven to cause AIDS.
204
 
President Mbeki therefore opposed government provisioning of 
antiretroviral therapy to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV.
205
 In 
2002, under President Mbeki‘s leadership, the National Department of 
Health adopted regulations that prohibited doctors from prescribing 
antiretroviral drugs except to patients in designated research programs.
206
 
An advocacy group challenged the regulations in court, and, in 2002, the 
Constitutional Court declared the restrictions to be unconstitutional and 
required that the government make antiretroviral treatment generally 
available.
207
 Still divided over the issue, the ANC did not take adequate 
national measures to fulfill this mandate.
208
 However, because the Court‘s 
ruling had freed the provinces from compliance with the now invalid 
national regulations, various provinces, including the opposition-
controlled Western Cape, instituted their own programs to ensure that 
antiretroviral treatments were administered.
209
 
The ANC‘s policies have now been largely discredited, and during the 
2009 election, the DA relied on its positive leadership and track record in 
the Western Cape regarding the antiretroviral issue.
210
 This strategy seems 
to have been effective. Commenting on the run-up to the 2009 election, a 
 
 
 202. The argument assumes that the issues are of public importance because they were able to 
gridlock the ruling party. Obviously, some issues could conceivably divide the party but not be of 
public importance.  
 203. See Lodge, supra note 197, at 743–44 (discussing how the ANC‘s gridlock over HIV/AIDS 
policy allowed provinces to exercise independence on the issue).  
 204. Mandisa Mbali, HIV/AIDS Policy-Making in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in STATE OF THE 
NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2003–2004, at 318 (John Daniel et al. eds., 2001).  
 205. Id. at 321–22. Mbeki cited unnecessary government expense and possible poisonous effects 
of antiretroviral drugs as justifications for opposing government provision of antiviral treatment. Id.  
 206. Id. at 324; see DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, HIV/AIDS & STD STRATEGIC PLAN FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA 2000–2005 (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.doh.gov.za/aids/index.html.  
 207. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC) (S. Afr.).  
 208. Lodge, supra note 197, at 743–44; see also AVERT, History of HIV & AIDS in South Africa, 
http://www.avert.org/history-aids-south-africa.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
 209. Lodge, supra note 197, at 743–44.  
 210. See DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, DA MANIFESTO: ELECTION 2009 18 (2009).  
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columnist wrote the following in a national newspaper: ―[T]he DA has a 
good track record. Compare ANC with DA rule in the Western Cape and 
Cape Town. Under the DA, the Western Cape rolled out antiretroviral 
drugs when all the ANC-ruled provinces were denying that HIV causes 
AIDS.‖211  
The ANC‘s HIV/AIDS debacle demonstrates that South Africa‘s 
federal structure can accommodate subnational policy track records that 
can be used effectively to promote political competition. The key is that 
the provinces have some form of independence from national policy. If 
provincial policy is preempted, the model is short-circuited. Thus far, 
ANC gridlock seems to be the only way that provinces gain any real 
policy independence. Even then, provinces are free to enact deviant policy 
only if no national policy exists—either because none was ever enacted or 
existing policy was declared invalid by the Court. 
VI. THE PROVINCES‘ ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY AND POLICY-BASED 
TRACK RECORDS 
Another way for the model to operate is for opposition parties to 
develop sound track records for government administration even if they 
are not able to develop independent substantive policy. This section 
considers that application of the model under South Africa‘s federal 
structure.  
The provinces have significant administrative responsibility. Provincial 
executives are exclusively responsible for implementing provincial law.
212
 
More importantly however, the NC provides that Parliament may require 
provincial executives to administer national legislation irrespective of 
whether the legislation falls within one of the province‘s enumerated 
powers.
213
 Thus, Parliament may enlist provincial executives to administer 
any national law. In practice, Parliament relies heavily on provincial 
government to administer national law. In 1999, more than seventy-five 
percent of all public servants were provincial officials.
214
 Furthermore, in 
 
 
 211. Andrew Kenny, It’s Got To Be The DA For Me, CITIZEN, Apr. 20, 2009 (on file with author).  
 212. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 125.  
 213. Id. Provincial executives have a standing obligation to implement national legislation that 
falls within one of the provinces‘ enumerated powers. Id. at § 125(3). For a full discussion of some 
further eccentricities regarding the relationship between national legislation and provincial executives, 
see RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 259–60. The only restriction on Parliament‘s 
assignment of administrative responsibilities to the provinces is that it must provide provinces with the 
means necessary to perform assigned obligations. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 125(3).  
 214. Lodge, supra note 197, at 738.  
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1999, more than forty-three percent of the country‘s overall revenue was 
assigned to the provinces so that they could meet their administrative 
responsibilities.
215
 This means that provincial administration involves 
significant responsibility and, consequently, the possibility of developing 
meaningful independent track records depending on the degree of 
independence from national control.  
Premiers have a fair degree of independence regarding the structure 
and appointment of their cabinets (Executive Councils).
216
 The Premier 
must appoint between five and ten provincial legislatures to serve on his or 
her Executive Council.
217
 The Premier defines the responsibilities of each 
member of the Council and may remove members unilaterally.
218
 The only 
exception to this is the position of Secretary which is established and 
defined by national legislation.
219
 The Premier may still appoint and 
remove the Secretary unilaterally. A Premier may also unilaterally 
reassign responsibilities among council members.
220
 The provincial 
legislature may remove the Premier, the Executive Council, or both by a 
vote of no-confidence.
221
 The national government does not have any 
analogous authority to remove provincial executives.
222
  
Administrative departments at both the national and provincial levels 
are established and structured by national legislation.
223
 Provinces have no 
independent authority to restructure or alter provincial departments.
224
 
Provinces similarly have no authority regarding the staffing of provincial 
departments.
225
 Instead, national legislation determines how provincial 
departments are structured, what their respective mandates are, and how 
 
 
 215. Id. at 740 (percentage calculated based on revenue figures provided by Lodge).  
 216. See generally RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 261.  
 217. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 132(1). The Western Cape constitution provides for a larger cabinet. 
See Dirk Brand, The Western Cape Provincial Constitution, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 961, 961 (2000). This is 
significant because the Constitutional Court held that this change to provincial executive authority was 
an exclusive executive power that could not be changed by national legislation unless it implicated a 
pressing national interest. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1997 (12) 
BCLR 1653 (CC) para. 15 (S. Afr.). This confirms that provincial executives have significant 
independence when it comes to the appointment and structure of their cabinets.  
 218. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 132(2).  
 219. See Premier of the Province of the Western Cape v. Pres. of the RSA 1999 (4) BCLR 383 
(CC) paras. 71–72 (S. Afr.) (discussing the various national statutes that govern the role of the 
provincial Secretary).  
 220. See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 261 (citing Montshioa v. Motshegare 
2001 (8) BCLR 833 (B) at 930 (S. Afr.).  
 221. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 §§ 109, 141.  
 222. Id. § 141; RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 216–62.  
 223. See Premier of the Province of the Western Cape 1999 (4) BCLR 383 (CC) paras. 1, 5 (S. 
Afr.) (describing the structure of administrative departments).  
 224. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 262 n.167.  
 225. Id.  
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they are staffed. Salaries for public servants employed in the provincial 
departments are also set by national legislation but must be paid by the 
provinces.
226
  
Nevertheless, despite the provinces‘ inability to restructure and staff 
administrative departments, provincial departments are ultimately 
managed by the Premier and his or her Executive Council.
227
 National 
government does not have authority to interfere with this responsibility 
unless the province is so derelict in its duties that national interests and 
basic services are threatened.
228
 Thus, provinces maintain a degree of 
management oversight that could form the basis for an independent 
administrative track record.  
Although Premiers cannot formally restructure administrative 
departments, they can establish a variety of management policies and 
protocols that affect the delivery of government services. They can also 
tackle the pervasive skills deficit that plagues provincial public servants 
and disrupts delivery of government services.
229
 Thus, Premiers have the 
independent authority to develop well-trained and efficient provincial 
departments. And because national law vests provincial government with 
substantial administrative responsibilities and provides them with large 
amounts of money to fulfill these responsibilities, provinces have a 
genuine opportunity to develop sound administrative track records 
regarding incredibly important and high-profile issues such as healthcare, 
education, and welfare.
230
 There is no reason why independent 
administrative track records of this sort could not trigger constructive 
political competition at the national level pursuant to the model.
231
  
VII. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT TRACK RECORDS 
South Africa‘s federal structure allows for municipal track records to 
promote political competition at the national level. South Africa has over 
 
 
 226. Lodge, supra note 197, at 741.  
 227. Premier of the Province of the Western Cape 1999 (4) BCLR 383 (CC) paras. 71–72 (S. 
Afr.). National Legislation provides that the Executive Council Secretary (also known as the Director 
General) is the head of provincial administrative departments. Id.  
 228. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 100(1).  
 229. See Lodge, supra note 197, at 739–40 (discussing skills deficit in provincial administration).  
 230. See id. at 741 (discussing the responsibilities that provinces have to administer service 
delivery in those areas).  
 231. See, e.g., Michael Trapido, W Cape: Zille’s Chance to Show the Other Provinces How It’s 
Done?, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/traps/2009/04/28/western-
cape-zille‘s-chance-to-show-8-other-provinces-a-prototype-for-success/ (stating hope that the 
opposition‘s new administration in the Western Cape will implement administrative polices that will 
improve delivery of government services and spur political competition).  
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300 local government institutions.
232
 The substantive powers of local 
government are a strict subset of the powers assigned to provincial 
government and subject to the same national preemption principles that 
apply to provincial government.
233
 By and large, therefore, most local 
government activities are dominated by provincial and national 
government policies and practices.
234
 
National legislation establishes unique municipal governments for the 
country‘s six major metropolitan areas.235 These municipalities enjoy 
exclusive executive authority within their jurisdictions and the subset of 
provincial powers assigned to them.
236
 Because of the size and economic 
significance of these metropolitan areas, their municipal governments have 
significant administrative responsibilities regarding delivery of crucial 
government services. Furthermore, because their municipal council 
members are separately elected, political parties may be able to use 
municipal government positions to develop positive administrative and 
character-based track records as in the provincial context. As noted above, 
a key issue in the municipal context is whether the responsibilities of local 
government are ―qualitatively comparable‖ to provincial and national 
responsibilities.
237
 On this point, South Africa‘s federal rules seem to 
provide sufficient independence for municipal governments, at least in the 
six major metropolitan areas, such that the model could apply.
238
  
 
 
 232. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 286.  
 233. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 151-64; RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 276–79.  
 234. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 139 (providing for provincial intervention in local government); 
RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 276 (―Parliament and the provinces exercise extensive 
control over local government.‖).  
 235. RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra note 138, at 286–87 (describing provisions of the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act). The six metropolitan municipalities are the City of Cape 
Town, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan (East Rand), eThekwini Metropolitan (Durban), the City of 
Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), and the City of Tshwane (Pretoria).  
 236. See id. at 297.  
 237. See supra Part III.B.3; Myerson, supra note 12, at 21.  
 238. Indeed, as discussed further below, the DA has relied heavily on their president‘s, Helen 
Zille‘s, record as the mayor of Cape Town where she won the 2008 World Mayor Award. See Cape 
Town Mayor Helen Zille, WORLD MAYOR, http://www.worldmayor.com/contest_2008/world-mayor-
2008-zille.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). Interestingly, the ANC majority in the National Assembly 
moved without notice to block a motion by the DA to recognize Zille‘s award. Id. The then-ANC-
controlled Western Cape legislature also sought to ―downgrade the city mayor‘s post to a ceremonial 
role and distribute the executive powers among the city council itself.‖ Id.  
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VIII. REAL POLITICAL COMPETITION AND SUBNATIONAL TRACK 
RECORDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Having examined the rules of South Africa‘s federal regime, this 
Article now turns to the reality of post-apartheid politics in South Africa to 
determine whether South Africa‘s federal structure is actually fostering 
political competition, as the model would suggest. South Africa‘s 2009 
general election presents promising signs for political competition in 
South Africa and provides compelling support for the real-world 
applicability of the policy-based model of political competition herein.  
A. The ANC’s Dominance from 1994 to 2004 
The first decade of post-apartheid politics was clearly dominated by the 
ANC. In 1994, during the country‘s first democratic election, the ANC 
won 63% of the national vote and 252 of the 400 seats in the National 
Assembly.
239
 Two opposition parties, the NP and the IFP won significant 
representation in the National Assembly. The NP won 82 seats and the IFP 
won 43 seats.
240
 The ANC won control of all but two of the provincial 
legislatures.
241
 The NP won control of the Western Cape by a slim margin, 
winning 23 of the possible 42 seats.
242
 The IFP won control of the 
KwaZulu-Natal legislature, winning 41 of the possible 81 seats.
243
 In the 
provincial legislatures of both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, the 
ANC was the second place vote-getter.
244
  
In 1999, the ANC increased its majority in the National Assembly by 
winning 66% of the national vote and taking 266 of the 400 seats.
245
 Three 
major opposition parties competed in the 1999 election. The newly formed 
Democratic Party (DP) took 38 National Assembly seats, the IFP took 34 
seats, and the New National Party took 28 seats.
246
 Most significantly, the 
ANC defeated the New National Party in the Western Cape legislature and 
closed to within two seats of the IFP in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature.
247
  
 
 
 239. See IEC Results, supra note 3.  
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  
 242. The ANC won 14 of the 42 seats. Id.  
 243. Id.  
 244. Id.  
 245. IEC Results, supra note 3. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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In 2004, the ANC obtained its largest majority in the National 
Assembly by winning 279 of the 400 seats, representing 70% of the 
national vote.
248
 The ANC also defeated the IFP in the KwaZulu-Natal 
legislature.
249
 However, the ANC did not win a majority in the Western 
Cape legislature, and it was forced to form a coalition with an opposition 
party, the DP.
250
 The DP‘s strength in the Western Cape legislature set the 
stage for it to gain enough support to successfully oppose the ANC‘s ill-
fated HIV/AIDS policies,
251
 and this prudent policy ultimately gave the 
DP a tremendous amount of political capital leading into the 2009 
election.  
B. Evidence of Opposition Success in 2009 
In 2009, the ANC won 264 of the 400 seats in the National 
Assembly.
252
 The DA won 67 seats, the Congress of the People (COPE) 
won 30 seats, and the IFP claimed 18 seats.
253
 This means that the ANC 
can afford to lose as many as 63 seats without losing control of the 
national government or being forced to form a majority coalition. Table 1 
below shows the four major parties‘ respective shares of the 400 seats in 
the National Assembly by provincial and national constituencies. The 
provincial constituency distributions show that the only party with 
consolidated provincial support is the DA. It won the majority of the 
Western Cape‘s National Assembly seats and was close behind the ANC‘s 
majority in both Gauteng and the Eastern Cape. No other opposition party 
challenged the ANC significantly in any other provincial constituency.  
 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See supra Part VI.B (discussing the HIV/AIDS controversy).  
 252. See IEC Results, supra note 3.  
 253. See id. This gave the ANC an unsurprising 65.9% majority. Id.  
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TABLE 1: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS BY CONSTITUENCY
254
 
PARTY 
NATIONAL 
CONSTITUENCY 
SEATS 
PROVINCIAL CONSTITUENCY SEATS 
EC FS Ga KZN Li Mp NW NC WC TOTAL 
ANC 126 19 9 31 36 17 14 11 3 8 264 
DA --
255
 6 4 19 7 2 2 2 2 23 67 
COPE 16 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 30 
IFP 9   1 8      18 
 
At the provincial level, the ANC won control of all provincial 
legislatures except for the Western Cape, where the DA narrowly defeated 
the ANC.
256
 Table 2 shows the party distribution of all provincial 
legislative seats won in the 2009 election. This distribution again shows 
that the Western Cape was the only province vulnerable to opposition 
control. The IFP retains consolidated but weakening support within 
KwaZulu-Natal. COPE appears to have more support in the Eastern Cape 
and Gauteng, but it is not yet a legitimate threat to the ANC‘s majority in 
either of those provinces.  
 
 
 254. Data taken from Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Seat Assignment 
National Assembly, http://www.elections.org.za/(click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 
28, 2011).  
 255. The DA did not submit a national constituency list of candidates. It nevertheless received its 
proportional share of candidates based on the national vote at large, but its national constituency seats 
were filled by candidates from its provincial candidate lists. See RAUTENBACH & MALHERBE, supra 
note 138, at 121–29 (explaining relevant electoral rules in this scenario).  
 256. See IEC Results, supra note 3.  
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TABLE 2: PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE SEATS BY PARTY
257
 
PARTY PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE SEATS 
 EC FS Ga KZN Li Mp NW NC WC 
ANC 44 22 47 51 43 27 25 19 14 
DP 6 3 16 7 2 2 3 4 22 
COPE 9 4 6 1 4 1 3 5 3 
IFP   1 18      
Independent Democrats   1     2 2 
United Democratic  
Movement 
3         
African Christian  
Democratic Party 
  1 1     1 
Minority Front    2      
Freedom Front Plus  1 1       
United Christian  
Democratic Party 
      2   
African Independent  
Congress 
1         
TOTAL 63 30 73 80 49 30 33 30 42 
 
Regarding municipal government, there are 300 local governments. In 
2006, the last local government election, the ANC won control of 203 
municipalities.
258
 The IFP won twenty-six municipalities, almost 
exclusivity within scarcely populated rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal.
259
 The 
DA won seven municipalities.
260
 Most importantly, however, the ANC 
won five of the six major metropolitan municipalities.
261
 The DA‘s victory 
in Cape Town was the only significant opposition victory in local 
 
 
 257. Data taken from Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Seat Assignment 
Provincial Legislatures, http://www.elections.org.za/(click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2011).  
 258. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2006 Local Government Elections, 
http://www.elections.org.za/ (click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).  
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.; see supra note 235 (listing the six metropolitan municipalities).  
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government. COPE was not formed until 2008 and therefore did not 
compete in the 2006 municipal elections.  
C. Analysis and Opposition Strategies for 2014 
The Article now explores whether the model could benefit any of the 
three major opposition parties as they are situated following the recent 
2009 election. This section is not intended to be a complete sociopolitical 
analysis. Instead, it explores some of the real-world possibilities of the 
model for purposes of illustrating its practical value and limitations. The 
inquiry is therefore limited to this question: do opposition parties have any 
real opportunities to develop subnational track records that they could use 
against the ANC in the 2014 general election?  
Of the three major opposition parties, COPE appears to be least likely 
to develop a subnational track record. COPE does not have control of any 
provincial or municipal governments. Although local government 
elections will take place in 2011, it is unlikely that COPE will win control 
of any of the six major metropolitan municipalities. Thus, COPE is 
unlikely to have any opportunity to develop a subnational track record of 
any kind that it could use against the ANC in the 2014 national elections.  
The IFP, on the other hand, seems to be operating in reverse under the 
model. The IFP‘s support base has traditionally been contained within 
KwaZulu-Natal.
262
 It won control of the province after the first democratic 
election in 1994.
263
 However, its support within the province has steadily 
dropped since then. In 1999, after five years of IFP control, the ANC came 
within less than two percentage points of beating the IFP.
264
 The ANC 
ultimately took control of the province in 2004 and retained control in 
2009.
265
 Since taking power, the ANC has been relentless in exposing the 
 
 
 262. See ANTHEA JEFFERY, THE NATAL STORY: 16 YEARS OF CONFLICT (1997).  
 263. See IEC Results, supra note 3 (the IFP won 41 of the 81 seats but formed a coalition with 
minority parties to gain control independent of the ANC); KWAZULU-NATAL MONITORING PROJECT, 
KwaZulu-Natal’s New Constitution: No Losers . . . Any Winners?, 1996 KWAZULU-NATAL BRIEFING 
1, 2 (explaining how the IFP won more votes than any other party and obtained control over the 
legislature by forming a coalition with minority parties).  
 264. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Provincial Elections ’99, KwaZulu-
Natal Results, http://www.elections.org.za/ (click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 
2011).  
 265. Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Provincial Elections ’04, KwaZulu-
Natal Results, http://www.elections.org.za/ (click ―Elections‖; then ―Results‖) (last visited Feb. 28, 
2011); Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, Provincial Elections ’09, KwaZulu-Natal 
Results, http://www.elections.org.za/content/uploadedFiles/2009%20National%20and%20Provincial% 
20Election%20candidate%20lists.pdf?n=9151 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).  
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IFP‘s apparent incompetence and corruption while in office.266 Thus, the 
IFP seems to have squandered an opportunity to develop a sound 
subnational track record that it could have used to challenge the ANC at 
the national level. Its poor track record and 2009 defeat nevertheless lend 
support to the notion that conditions within South Africa can support the 
model.
267
 
In contrast to COPE and the IFP, the DA is currently well positioned to 
take advantage of the model. It won control of the Western Cape 
provincial government from the ANC in 2009. Thus, unlike any of the 
other opposition parties, it can use the next five years to develop a positive 
provincial track record. Since 2006, the DA has also controlled the City of 
Cape Town. The DA‘s president, Helen Zille, has received international 
recognition for her governance of the City of Cape Town, particularly her 
track record of dealing with corruption.
268
 Since the 2009 election, Zille 
has served as the Premier of the Western Cape.  
The DA appears to be convinced that it can mount a successful 
campaign against the ANC based on its subnational track records. The 
DA‘s 2009 election campaign and its ongoing campaigns regarding the 
upcoming 2010 local government election have relied heavily on Zille‘s 
positive track record as the mayor of the City of Cape Town. The party‘s 
current website has as one of its main taglines: ―DA: A Strong Track 
Record in Government.‖269 The website provides a report card of DA 
activities and policies in the City of Cape Town and other notable 
municipalities.
270
 Perhaps most revealing of the DA‘s commitment to a 
bottom-up opposition strategy is the fact that Zille did not go to the 
National Assembly, but chose to remain in the Western Cape as Premier 
following the 2009 election. As noted above, she is the first party 
president to pass up a seat in the National Assembly for a position in 
provincial government.  
 
 
 266. We rescued KZN, says Ndebele, IOL NEWS, Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.iol.co.za/news/ 
politics/we-rescued-kzn-says-ndebele-1.435007 (―When the ANC took over the reins from the IFP the 
provincial government was in a near state of collapse. Sixty percent of schools had no power. Fifty 
percent of schools used pit latrines while most had no toilets at all.‖).  
 267. This point is particularly important because ethnic loyalties in voting undermine Myerson‘s 
model. The IFP drew its support from the Zulu people. However, it seems that these loyalties may be 
softening since the IFP was removed from office. An alternative theory, however, is that Zulu loyalties 
are not gone but divided. The ANC‘s president, Jacob Zuma, is Zulu.  
 268. See supra note 238.  
 269. See Democratic Alliance, http://www.da.org.za/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).  
 270. See A Strong Track Record In Government, Democratic Alliance, http://www.da.org.za/ 
campaigns.htm?action=view-page&category=6592.  
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It is obviously difficult to determine empirically whether the DA‘s 
track record in the City of Cape Town caused its success in the 2009 
Western Cape election. However, the DA has clearly adopted an 
opposition strategy built around strong subnational track records. The 
party seems to be staking its future on the viability of the model.  
CONCLUSION 
Federalism is not a panacea. It cannot cure all difficulties facing 
emerging democracies. It can, however, play a significant role in fostering 
political competition if certain legal parameters and political 
circumstances are met. The ANC has dominated South African politics 
since the country‘s first democratic election in 1994. Many citizens, 
onlookers, and commentators sense that legitimate political competition is 
necessary for South Africa‘s democracy to take the next step towards 
consolidation. South Africa‘s federal regime presents opposition parties 
with real opportunities to develop policy- and character-based track 
records, and the DA has already taken advantage of these opportunities to 
gain significant victories over the ANC in the Western Cape. What 
remains to be seen is whether the model‘s formal logic will translate to 
real and meaningful political competition between the DA and the ANC in 
the 2014 national election.  
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